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One theoretical research topic in organizational economics is the information is-
sues raised in different organizations. This has been extensively studied in last three
decades. One common feature of these research is focusing on the asymmetric in-
formation among different agents within one organization. However, in reality, we
usually face the following situation. A group of people within an organization are
completely transparent to each other; however, their characters are not known by
other organization members who are outside this group. In my dissertation, I try to
study how this information sharing would affect the outcome of different organiza-
tions. I focus on two organizations: corporate board and political parties. I find that
this information sharing may be detrimental for (some of) the members who shared
information. This conclusion stands in contrast to the conventional wisdom in both
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Preface
Organizational economics use economic logic and methods to understand the exis-
tence, design and performance of organizations. According to Kenneth Arrow (1974),
organizations are explained broadly. They include business corporations, unions, leg-
islatures, agencies, churches, and much more.
In last several decades, within Arrow’s broad view of organizations, researchers
from economics, finance, political science, psychology and many other fields of social
science have done important contributions to help us understand a wide range of
issues of different organizations. The most influential research includes the following.
Coase (1937) raised the question of the boundaries of the firm. Berle and Means
(1991) described conflicts of interest arising from the separation of corporate owner-
ship by shareholders from corporate control by top managers. Simon (1951) offered
perhaps the first formal model in organizational economics. Williamson (1975) con-
cerned more extensively on the nature and boundaries of modern firms. Marschak and
Radner (1972) modeled optimal communication and decision-making processes in an
environment with uncertainty. Hurwicz (1973) introduced the concept of mechanism
design theory and set up the framework of organizational design. Meanwhile, Mirrlees
(1976) and Ho¨lmstrom (1979) introduced formal models of moral hazard, launching
a literature that have tremendous influence on organizational economics. A compre-
hensive survey on these topics is documented in Gibbons and Roberts (2013).
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Outline of the dissertation
As mentioned above, one theoretical research topic in organizational economics
is the information issues raised in different organizations. This has been extensively
studied in last three decades. Researchers try to understand different questions,
including the following. What information is collected, by whom, to whom is com-
municated and how is it used? How are people rewarded in an organization under
uncertainty? What norms exist regarding information asymmetry toward people in
the organization, as well as outsiders who are related to the organization?
One common feature of these research is focusing on the asymmetric information
among different agents within one organization. However, in reality, we usually face
the following situation. A group of people within an organization are completely
transparent to each other; however, their characters are not known by other organi-
zation members who are outside this group.
For instance, in modern corporate firms, board is a organization. Within the
board, they are divided to different groups or factions according to different charac-
ters or interests. Board directors usually represent shareholders of different interests.
Directors with the same interests usually share information with each other before
the board decisions. In the first chapter of my dissertation, I model board direc-
tors as two groups of players with different interests and study the effects of market
reputation, and information sharing on boardroom collusion and decisions. A new
multilateral bargaining model is proposed which incorporates the idea that there may
be information sharing among groups of directors with the same interests. I focus on
the advisory role of corporate boards and assume that during boardroom decisions,
directors provide information (expertise) which is productive but only privately ob-
served. I find that: If a minority director has a good market reputation of having
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an expertise in one field and his information contributes more in the current safe
project (policy) than the new risky one, there may exist conflicts among the majority
directors, leading to a decreased level of private benefits for a certain director, and
therefore decrease the probability of collusion among the majority. Then the majority
director who can propose the project would collude with a minority director. This
result could be independent from the information provided by majority directors and
a majority director’s market reputation. Using the insights from the model, we also
analyze: 1) The interactions between controlling shareholders and minority share-
holders; 2) The relation between the project selection and independence of the board;
3) The relation between management selection and market reputation. Some of the
results are illustrated with examples from Apple Inc., Microsoft Inc..
In modern political regime, we have the same situations as corporate boards.
Politicians are divided to different parties or factions according to their ideologies or
interests. Politicians within a party or faction usually engage in information sharing.
This information sharing could be forced by some special rules or other norms. How-
ever, across parties, information may not be shared. In chapter two of my dissertation,
I study the effect of information sharing on distributive politics. I use the bargaining
model proposed in chapter one that incorporates the idea that there may be infor-
mation sharing amongst politicians in the same party. Absent information sharing,
the party leadership will provide legislative pork to their party members. However,
with information sharing, there may exist conflicts between party members. This
may result in a decreased level of legislative pork for certain party members. Thus,
information sharing may be detrimental for (some of) the party’s own members. This
conclusion stands in contrast to the conventional wisdom that parties help their party
members achieve legislative goals.
In chapter 3, I switch back to corporate board, but try to study a question which
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is different from the previous two chapters. In the literature, we know that firm’s
performance depends on the ”type” of the management—whether it is efficient or
non-efficient. Literature also suggests that the board also plays an important role in
firm’s performance. In particular, this paper views the board as a medium, which
transmits the information of the management’s type to the shareholder. The share-
holder then designs a compensation scheme for both the management and the board
conditional on firm’s performance. This paper studies how interactions between the
board and the management influence the firm’s performance and, thereby, influence
the shareholder’s welfare. It first considers a setting, in which the board can not col-
lude with the management. It observes a noisy signal of the management’s type, and
reports this signal to the shareholder. The shareholder can only obtain information
of the management from the board, and knows how accurate the signal observed by
the board. This paper finds that the board can have a positive or negative influence
on the firm’s performance. Whether the influence is positive or negative depends on
the accuracy of the signal and whether the signal infers the management is efficient.
This paper then turns to an alternative setting, in which the board is allowed to
collude with the management. In particular, the collusion is modeled with a bargain-
ing game, where the board and the management bargain over the payment from the
shareholder. With this additional feature, the paper find that: The cost of blocking
the collusion depends on the structure of the board—whether the board is depen-
dent or independent. The results have several implications for organization design of
corporate board and board regulation.
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Chapter 1
MARKET REPUTATION, INFORMATION SHARING AND BOARDROOM
COLLUSION : THEORY
1.1 Introduction
From empirical literature, we already know that in many countries, minority share-
holders, which usually indicate outside investors and creditors, have a large impact
on the economy, see Lo´pez de Silanes et al. (1998) and Porta et al. (1999). 1
Empirical research in economics, finance and law also document that: in many
countries, which is more than 49 countries in the previous research, there are con-
flicts between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders. When minority
shareholders finance firms, they face the risk that the returns on their investment will
never be materialized, because the controlling shareholders or managers expropriate
them. For instance, the controlling shareholders can manipulate firms’ decisions by
controlling majority positions in the corporate board; they might sell the output, the
assets or the additional securities in the firm they control to another firm they own at
a lower price through the firms’ decisions. Or the entrepreneurs may extend the size
of the firm on the cost of outside investors through project selections, such as merge
other firms or set up a new product line. The basic conflict is that the controlling
shareholders use the profit of a firm to benefit themselves rather than return the
money to the minority shareholders.
This kind of conflict arises in many countries for two reasons: The first reason
is due to the incomplete legal system. In some countries, the legal system does not
1In these research, the authors found that the average ratio of stock market capitalization held
by minority shareholders to GNP is more than 40% in a sample of 49 countries.
1
protect minority shareholders because of either poor laws or poor enforcement of
laws. And the second is the corporate governance structure of public companies gives
controlling shareholders more chances to have more positions in the corporate board,
or to install family members in managerial positions, see La Porta et al. (2000).
So one question asked in the literature is: why are people willing to be minority
shareholders even if they know that the laws or corporate governance mechanisms can
not protect them from expropriation by controlling shareholders? This paper tries
to answer this question by opening the black box of board room decisions. We want
to argue that, despite the fact that a corporate governance mechanism fails in many
aspects, the minority shareholders still do well if they can appoint board directors
whose expertise could affect the firm’s performance.
Under this framework, one key assumption is that board directors represent share-
holders of different interests. In some sense, we think that the boardroom conflicts
and collusion are inevitable because the board is composed of different interest groups
2 . For example, it is highly unlikely that the interests of inside directors, namely ex-
ecutives within the firm, the outside, independent directors, and the “gray” directors
will be congruent. The attitude between the groups ranges from cynical indiffer-
ence to open defiance. Among outside directors, even if they are in the majority,
there are conflicts of interest, in view of the fact that they (1) represent shareholders,
debt-holders, and other stakeholders (e.g., Byrd and Mizruchi (2005) on bankers on
the board; Baker and Gompers (2003) on Venture capitalists; Faleye et al. (2006)
on employees); (2) are members of different demographics (e.g., Adams and Ferreira
(2009) on gender mix); (3) belong to different social networks (e.g.,Kramarz and
2We have not found any literature in economics or finance which formally document the existence
of interest group or factions in the corporate board, even if the stories about this board politics are
floating around on newspapers. However, in law literature, we do find some evidences about the
interest groups or factions in the corporate board. From the historical view, the board of East Indian
Company might be the best example to support our argument here, see Gevurtz (2004).
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Thesmar (2006)); (4) possess different strategic views about the business (e.g., Demb
et al. (1992); (5) were appointed before and after the current CEO took office (e.g.,
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998)).
Based on anecdote and empirical evidence, this paper attempts to open the black
box of the boardroom processes and dynamics by modeling directors as players who
represent shareholders of different interests. We try to formalize the interactions
within the board and give a rational explanation to the famous anecdote, like Apple’s
board conflict in 1985. To our best knowledge, it is the first theoretical attempt to
study the boardroom collusion.
This model has four features: (1) Information is shared among directors with
the same interests; (2) the market has belief in the directors’ ability or expertise;
(3) production is directly affected by the board directors’ advice (information or ex-
pertise); and (4) the board is composed of directors with diverse interests. For the
first one, information sharing, we assume that in a group with the same interest,
directors would share their private information among each other. The motivation
is as follows: From the informational perspective, board members are always treated
as policy specialists. These policies can be related to the board’s monitoring role,
its advising role or the directors’ visions. The monitoring tasks include the hiring,
firing, and assessment of management (e.g., Hirshleifer and Thakor (1994); Hermalin
and Weisbach (1998)), while the advising role involves setting of strategy and project
selection (e.g., Song and Thakor (2006); Adams and Ferreira (2007)). The vision is
a purely personal characteristic. It can help coordinate the firm’s activities around a
common goal (e.g.,Bolton et al. (2010)). While almost all the current theories look
at the board as one entity, (see Adams et al. (2008) for a review), and neglect this
information aspect. But we think that, within board interactions, each of the board
members might possess these private, different information about the relationship
3
between policies (or project) and their consequences, and they might belong to dif-
ferent interest groups 3 . And one important way in which the interest group help
its members achieve common goals is by serving as a mechanism for sharing this
private information within the group. This feature, information sharing, also has
been argued as one key feature in team building (e.g.,Bolton et al. (2013)). And
one communication mechanism inducing information sharing has been discussed by
theoretical literature, see Adams and Ferreira (2007) for one of them.
For the second one, market reputation, the motivation has been argued by the
literature for a long time, which may go back to Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen
(1983). They point out that the management and the directors care about their
reputation on the market, and the reputation would also affect their compensation.
In this paper, the CEO is not necessarily to be excluded from the board. We
explain the directors’ market reputation as the shareholders’ belief on the directors’
“type”. For the director who is the management, we follow Milbourn (2003), and
explain the “type” as the ability. Their market reputation is the CEO’s perceived
ability. The ability here is not only about what the CEOs can do, but also relates
to the information they get. And the information is assumed to affect the project
or policy outcome. Efficient CEOs are assumed to always get more precise news on
the outcome of the selected project or policy. For example, John Sculley is an expert
on marketing, his network may bring him lots of information on a new market which
would benefit the firm. This network would have the same meaning as the ability.
For the non-management directors, the “type” could have very broad explanation.
From the view of monitoring, we can think about the directors being vigilant and who
3Numerous empirical works examine board structure and its potential impact on the board’s
actions and firm performance (e.g., Faleye et al. (2006); Linck et al. (2008)), but few studies the
internal bargaining and decision-making process in the boardroom that links the board’s structure
and its actions or performance. This missing link is largely due to data limitation.
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would monitor management very intensively, or being lax and who would not monitor
management intensively. From the view of advice, we can think about the type as
whether the directors observe a piece of information on the outcome of the project or
if the information they observe is precisely related to the outcome of the project. The
similar argument on the directors as experts of policy or project has already been
mentioned in the literature, see Adams et al. (2008).
For the third one, board director’s affect to production, this feature has been
documented in both descriptive and empirical literature, e.g., Vafeas (1999). One
common argument is that directors provide expertise in board decisions which would
further affect the firm’s performance. Or a more effective board might give more
proper advice or monitor more frequently than others. Then these actions would
affect the management, so as the performance of the firm. Following this argument,
we would formally model this feature by considering a technology which is directly
affected by the board directors’ expertise.
The fourth, diversity of board directors, has not been mentioned too much in the
literature. But we think it is a crucial feature of the corporate boards. This is because
as boards grow, it is possible to accept directors representing different interests and
thus induce diversity. Baranchuk and Dybvig (2009) also notices this feature of the
board. They try to analyze the decisions in diverse corporate boards. They did
not explicitly characterize the interactions among directors, but they focus on some
cooperative feature in board decisions. We try to analyze this in another way and
focus on the non-cooperative feature in board decisions.
Combining the above four features, in this paper we argue that, by sharing infor-
mation, controlling shareholders with majority seats in the board could more easily
propose and control the selection of new project (policy). This would be preferred by
them, in the sense that the director could get an agreement on the proposal with lower
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cost and other directors in the group could also get benefits from the new project.
Therefore, if we relabel one of the directors as the management, this could be an ex-
planation on a friendly board, see Adams and Ferreira (2007) for other explanations.
Meanwhile, more surprisingly, we also try to argue that: Information sharing may
reveal the director’s private information regarding his expectation of the size of the
project outcome, resulting in possibly a smaller slice received by the directors who
share the information. The conflicts induced from information sharing may prevent
collusion among directors in the same interest group 4 . And a possible prediction is
that the directors in the majority, even if he is in high ability, might be excluded from
the collusion due to the information sharing; and the director in the minority would
be included in the coalition. This result gives an answer to the question we mentioned
above. The minority shareholders can actually protect themselves by appointing an
experienced director to a corporate board.
Another point we want to argue is that a director with a good market reputation
may not be retained in the position; however, a director with a bad market reputation
may be retained in the position. This is because the information sharing induce a non-
symmetric expectation on the return of the new project. Meanwhile, the asymmetric
information gives the proposer incentives to take risks to gamble on the minority
director being non-efficient type and to propose a project which would give hims a
high level of residual. These combined two effects induce a non-linear relation between
the market reputation and the turn over of management. In other words, this result
suggests that the shareholders may not really care about the performance of the firm,
what they need is the highest residual to themselves. This is an inefficient result
induced by boardroom politics.
4Another trade-off could be that information sharing may intensify mutual monitoring among
the peers. See Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Landier et al. (2009), and Acharya et al. (2011) for
theoretical framework and Li (2013) for empirical tests.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 previews the assumptions of the
model, while Section 3 provide the main results and intuition. Section 4 presents the
model. Section 5 analyzes the benchmark model. Section 6 analyzes the main model
and gives the main results. Finally, Section 7 gives comparative statics. Section
8 gives implications of our main results. The last section concludes the paper by
discussing several extendible assumptions. The appendix contains all the proofs.
1.2 Preview of the Approach
We first give a description of the model, with the goal to explain key assumptions.
The paper focuses on distribution of net profit in a firm. To simplify analysis but
without loss of generality, we assume that there are three board directors divided
into two groups. It could be executive and non-executive or insiders and outsiders
or any other divisions. We call the one with more directors as a majority group
and the other as a minority group. One member of each group is designated as the
group leadership. Under this framework, controlling shareholders are represented by
the majority group, and the minority shareholders are represented by directors of
the minority group. At the beginning, the leadership of the majority group makes a
proposal on the new project. The value of the project to each director is the level
of benefit each director receives. The “project” and “benefit” here could arise from
many specific decisions. For example, the insider directors may propose and vote for
a pay raise which is a cost to the outsider directors; the stockholder may propose a
new bond issuance while the debt-holder may vote against. In a more general sense,
we can understand the “benefit” as a net profit of a project or a pie that all the board
members are competing for. The proposal passes if a majority of the board vote to
accept. If not, the proposal is rejected and they get their reservation values.
Each board director is associated with a type, which is a private signal obtained
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by themselves. Every signal carries a piece of information about the consequence of
a specified project (or policy). When directors in the same group engage in informa-
tion sharing, the types are commonly known within each group but are still private
information across the groups. One way to think of these signals is that each director
has expertise in his own field. For instance, some board directors might be experts in
marketing, some may be experts on risk control. And we assume that the outcome
or the return of the project is composed of consequences of a bundle of the expertise.
The types of different directors will influence the return of the project. For instance,
if a director is an expert on marketing, then his expertise might affect the firm’s sale
in the fast east market. This would be part of the return of the firms’ new project.
In this case, he might know exactly what is the consequence of a new marketing
strategy, but this information is difficult to be observed by others. However, when
directors with the same interest engage in information sharing, they would credibly
communicate with each other. Here we do not model the detail of the communication
process. It could be a required rule by the group which is one feature of team build
(e.g., Bolton et al. (2013)). Or we can think about a communication game between
the directors, such as the one described in Adams and Ferreira (2007).
Let us take note of some important features of the model. First, the goal here is
to focus on the role of information sharing and market reputation on the directors’
types . So we abstract away from other preferences of different groups, such as the
ideology or the risk attitude.
Second, directors make proposals about the level of return to be distributed. That
is, they bargain over the dollar amount. For instance, the board member will make an
offer in the form of a promise to increase the executive compensation, to give money
for charity, etc. He offers these concrete objects (or dollar amounts) instead of simply
offering a share of the total ex post return.
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In a world of complete information, bargaining over the dollar amount is equiv-
alent to bargaining over the share of the pie. So, while typical formulations, e.g.,
Rubinstein (1982) or Baron and Ferejohn (1989), study models where bargainers ne-
gotiate over the share of the pie, their model is equivalent to one in which bargainers
negotiate over dollar amounts. But, this need not be the case when there is asym-
metric information. In this case, bargainers may have different expectations about
the return of the project, i.e., size of the pie, and these different expectations may
correspond to different expected shares of the pie. For example, suppose one director
expects the return to be 100 million dollars and another expects 200 million dollars.
If the first offers the second 50 million dollars, then the first believes she is making
an offer of half the pie, while the second believes she received an offer of one quarter
of the pie. Assuming that the bargainers negotiate the share of the pie misses an
important strategic implication that arises from this mismatch of beliefs.
In practice, the board directors do make offers in terms of dollar amounts and not
shares of the pie. The fact that there is uncertainty about the return introduces an
important strategic consideration: A director may offer a proposal that turns out to
exceed the return. If this happens, we assume that the proposer, think about him as
the chairman of the board, can secure funds, through refinance, for the dollar amounts
(or projects) that have been promised to other directors but cannot secure the funds
for himself. That is, if the chairman promised a return to other board directors, he
must deliver. In practice, the board do request an extension of the return to fulfill
projects.
Although the model allows for the proposal to go over return, the equilibrium we
solve for has the feature that the proposer makes an offer that does not go above
return, i.e., for any realization of the directors’ types. Thus, the proposer ensures
that he also receives positive return.
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1.3 Summary of Results
We consider three variants of the model. The first two are benchmarks. In the
first one, there is information sharing among directors who represents shareholders of
the same interest, but the directors’ reservation value from no agreement is constant
and there is no uncertainty on the reservation values. In the second one, there is no
information sharing among directors, even if they represent shareholders of the same
interest. But their reservation values from no agreement depend on the outcome,
which are also affected by directors’ expertise. In the third one, there is information
sharing among directors who represent shareholders of the same interest, and their
reservation value from no agreement also depends on outcome and each director’s
information.
First of all, in all these models, majority voting induces that: To reach an agree-
ment, the proposer only needs to collude with one from the other two. The difference
among the three models is: who is included and what is proposed?
In the first model, the proposer, one of the majority directors, would always choose
the one with the lowest reservation value — smallest share from safe project. That is
because a director would always accept any proposal which gives at least as much as
his reservation value. Therefore, the proposer would choose the one with lowest share.
In this model, new project would always be selected by the board and agreement is
reached for sure.
In the second model, for the proposer, he could gamble on the type of the other two
directors. Thus, he could give a proposal which is only enough to cover the reservation
value from a non-efficient minority director; or he could pay a higher value to get an
agreement for sure. The final decision would depend on the comparison between the
returns from the safe project and the new proposed risky project. If the benefit from
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the safe project is high enough and the cost to buy off the non-efficient director is
low enough, the proposer would take the risk to give a proposal which is only enough
to cover the reservation value of a non-efficient director. Otherwise, director 1 would
pay a higher value to get an agreement for sure. We find that under some conditions,
the proposer would collude with the director who has a good market reputation, no
matter if he is a majority director or a minority director. In other words, the director
with a good reputation would benefit from colluding with the proposer. If directors
have the same market reputation, the proposer would be indifferent between buying
off any of the other two. However, if we include ideology into the preference, director
1 would strictly prefer to collude with his group member, the majority director. One
feature of this model is that the board may not reach an agreement on the selection
of new project.
In the third model, the proposer has the same trade off as the second one. However,
due to information sharing, if he wants to get an agreement for sure, his group member
would never be symmetric to the minority director. We find that, if minority director’s
information and reputation could induce a higher expected return from no agreement
(the safe project) than the new risky project, the majority director who can propose
would strictly prefer to collude with minority director. Meanwhile, he would take
the risk to give a proposal which is only enough to cover a non-efficient minority
director’s reservation value. This is because a high expectation from the safe project
and the low cost to collude with a non-efficient minority director give incentives to the
majority director to collude with the minority directors. A more subtle issue here is
that, in this model, the proposal by the majority director would carry information on
his group member’s type. However, by pooling his proposals on the group member’s
type, the majority director could manipulate the minority director’s belief and lower
the expectation on the outcome, and further lower the cost of collusion.
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We also find that if the market believes that with very high probability, say 99%,
one of the majority directors is a non-efficient type, then it is possible that a majority
director with proposal power will collude with the minority director, even if he knows
that his group member is indeed an efficient type.
Let us understand why. On one hand, if the market believes it is almost true that
the director in majority is a non-efficient type, then the minority director would put
a low weight on the expected return from an efficient type majority director. This
would decrease the minority director’s expectation on the return. On the other hand,
however, if the market believes that the minority director is an efficient type, then the
majority director would put a high weight on the expected return from an efficient
type minority director. This would increase the majority director’s expectation on
the return. Therefore, if the majority leadership wants to reach an agreement im-
mediately, he needs to choose the one with low expected pay off from no agreement.
Then the director in the minority group would be preferred. This result is also true,
even if the leadership knows exactly that his group member is efficient.
The insights of the model also deliver several testable implications:
• For the proposed risky project, if the probability of getting a good project is
high, then the management would prefer a less independent (passive or friendly)
board, in the sense that the management could share information with the
board. Otherwise, the management would prefer a more independent board, in
the sense that no information is shared with the board.





Let us consider an environment with three board directors 5 . They are divided
into two groups, I = {1, 2}, which are called majority directors, and O = {3},
which is called minority director. Under this framework, we can think about group
I as directors who represent controlling shareholders, and group O as a director who
represents minority shareholders.
Every director has expertise or knowledge in one field. The expertise would affect
the firm’s performance. Before board decisions, each director privately observes a
piece of information or signal in their own fields. The information can be effective or
non-effective in the firm’s performance. For convenience, we use “type” to indicate
the information or expertise obtained by each director. We assume that the type
could be either efficient viz. θi =1, or non-efficient
6 viz. θi=0, where i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
After observing signals, director 1’s information is assumed to be publicly revealed
to all the other two directors. Director 2 and 3’s information is still assumed to be
privately observed. However, the market has a belief (or priors) on 2 and 3’s types,
which is represented by probability distributions:
Prob{θi = 0} = pii ∈ [0, 1] ∀i ∈ {2, 3}
The types are independently distributed and the probability is common knowledge
among all directors.
5Unlike the literature of corporate board which usually uses board as shorthand for the board
minus the management, we would include the management as a director of the board.
6Here, the word “efficient” refers to situations like: precise information on the return of project,
expertise on marking, strong network, or even vigilant in monitoring, i.e., all the characters inducing
a hight level return. Meanwhile, the word “non-efficient” refers to situations like: no information on
the return of project, amateur on sale, weak network, or lax in monitoring, i.e., all the characters
inducing a low level of return.
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The market beliefs can be explained as follows. If director i is famous for his
expertise in marketing, then the market would believe that with high probability
this director would provide precise information about the sale, which would further
improve the firm’s performance, i.e., pii → 0. Otherwise, the market would have an
opposite belief, i.e., pii → 1.
During board decisions, we allow director 1 to have proposal power on the project
(policy) selection, i.e., he can given a proposal on projection selections and a division
of the outcome. For convenience, we can think about director 1 as the chairman of
the board. But our results is not restricted to this explanation.
Remark Several remarks on the set up are listed here.
• From the view of advisory role of corporate board, the types could be explained
as the expertise or private network of the directors. For example, director 3
might be an expert in risk control, and director 2, the CEO, might be an expert
in marketing. Or we can think about the type as a piece of news on the return
of the project. For example, one of the directors might be in charge of the
marketing department, so it is reasonable to assume that he could get more
accurate information about the new market.
• We can also explain types from the view of monitoring, the type could be
vigilant or lax. The vigilant directors would always monitor the management
very intensively. However, the lax type would not monitor the management too
intensively.
• We can also think about director 1’s type as the level of investment from some
institutional investors and it is publicly revealed to each director. This expla-
nation is not from the view of information, but it would not affect the analysis
and main idea of this paper.
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1.4.2 Technology
We assume that there are two technologies in this environment. One represents
a risky project, the other represents a safe project. For any technology, there is an
endowment, e > 0, which will be used in production.
If a risky project is proposed and finally selected by the board, then the outcome
is represented by a linear technology,
y = e+ µ˜(θ2, θ3|θ1)
Here, µ˜(θ2, θ3|θ1) indicates the return of a new risky project. It is a function of each
director’s type. We assume that
µ˜(θ2, θ3|θ1) =

µ(θ2, θ3|θ1) If good project
0 If bad project
Here, µ(θ2, θ3|θ1) is return from a good project, and 0 is return from a bad project.
And the probability of getting a good project is
Prob{good project} = ρ ∈ (0, 1)
Then the expected return from the risky project would be ρµ(θ2, θ3|θ1).
If no risky project is finally selected by board, then we assume a safe project
is implemented. The outcome of the safe project is represented by another linear
technology,
y = e+ k(θ2, θ3|θ1)
Here, e > 0 is endowment, k(θ2, θ3|θ1) is the return of the safe project.
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The outcome y, no matter from a risky or a safe project, is assumed to be not
realized during the board decisions. Directors’ interactions would be based on their
expectation on others’ information.
Remark One key feature of these technologies is that the directors provide informa-
tion or expertise in the board decisions, which would further affect the firm’s perfor-
mance through project selection. In the descriptive and empirical literature, people
have already documented that directors provide expertise during board decisions, see
Adams et al. (2008) for a survey on the literature. This set up is also motivated by
the fact that: The provision of advice and “monitoring” to management is one of the
top functions of board directors in the United States, see Monks and Minow (1996).
And this function has been emphasized to be important in the firm’s performance,
see Adams et al. (2008). Therefore, we explicitly put the function of “advice” and
“monitoring” in the production function to catch the point that the board’s advice
would affect the firm’s performance.
For the return of the projects, we assume it is true that,
Assumption 1.4.1 ( Good project > safe project > Bad project).
M > µ(θ2, θ3|θ1) > k(θ2, θ3|θ1) > 0 ∀θ1, θ2, θ3
Assumption 1.4.2 (Monotonicity & Anonymity ).
µ(θ2, θ3|1) > µ(θ2, θ3|0) and k(θ2, θ3|1) > k(θ2, θ3|0) ∀θ2, θ3
For all θ1
µ(1,1|θ1) > µ(1, 0|θ1)=µ(0,1|θ1) > µ(0, 0|θ1) > 0
k(1,1|θ1) > k(1, 0|θ1)=k(0,1|θ1) > k(0, 0|θ1) > 0
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The idea of the assumption is that:
• In a good state, the risky project always induces a higher return than other
projects; a safe project is always better than a bad project.
• Director 2 and 3’s information is symmetric in the contribution to the project
or only the aggregate information matters. This means that: It does not matter
who is efficient in the production, only the number of efficient type matters; or
equivalently, only the number of no-efficient type matters.
• Efficient type always induces higher return and the return is increasing with
the number of efficient directors. This assumption has been confirmed by some
empirical research, e.g., Vafeas (1999). They found that a more efficient board
would induce better firm performance.
• The return is bounded and the loss can not be higher than the initial investment,
i.e., no bankruptcy is allowed.
Here we assume µ(1, 0|θ1) = µ(0, 1|θ1), but this is not crucial in the analysis. We just
want to be consistent with the assumption that directors 2 and 3 are symmetric in
the contribution to the firm’s performance. All the results are true if we replace the
equality with an inequality in any direction.
Remark Several remarks on the return are listed here.
• For convenience, we can think about the returns, µ(θ2, θ3|θ1) or k(θ2, θ3|θ1), as
the NVP of the project. But all the results can be explained in a broader way.
• This set up on the returns further implies that each director’s expectation on
the output would depend on the other directors’ type.
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• We do not specify the exact form of return. In general, it could be a determined
form, which means there is no uncertainty. It could also be a stochastic form,
which means there is uncertainty on the return. The only difference is that, if
the return has a stochastic form, director 1 needs to take expectation on the
residual. However, the main results do not depend on the form of return.
1.4.3 Bargaining
For clarity of the sequential decision, we turn to the timing of the bargaining.
1. Each director privately observes an independent signal θi in their own field.
Director 1’s information is publicly revealed to the other two directors. Market
forms a belief on 2 and 3’s type.
2. The proposer, director 1, proposes a risky project and a division of the outcome
(p2(h
0), p3(h
0)), which is a mapping from 1’s information set to R2+. Here h
0 is
the information set, after which director 1 gives a proposal.
3. After seeing the proposal, all three directors vote on the proposal simultane-
ously. Voting strategy is a mapping from i’s information set to {Yes, No} or
{Accept, Reject}.
4. Majority rule determines the result, i.e., if at least two choose to accept, then
game over, the risky project is launched and proposal is implemented. Oth-
erwise, the safe project is launched, and every director gets their reservation
values from the safe project.
To simplify analysis, the reservation value is assumed to be a third of the outcome
from the safe project for each director, which is denoted as,
r(y|θ1, θ2, θ3) = 1
3
[
1 + k(θ2, θ3|θ1)
]
∀i = 1, 2, 3
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Because board structure changes only infrequently, we assume that over the decisions
in the model, the composition of the board and each group stay the same.
As mentioned in the preview section, the proposals might be over the return,
i.e., larger than the realization of y, then we assume that the proposer, director 1,
always gets money outside to guarantee that 2 and 3 get what 1 proposed. And the
proposer gets a payoff zero. This represents the fact that the chairman could require
investment from other investors or financial market.
1.4.4 The Preference
We assume that the directors are all risk neutral. Their preferences are defined
as follows: for director 1,
u1 =

max {Outcome− p2 − p3, 0} Agreement
1
3
outcome of safe project No Agreement
If an agreement is reached, and the realized outcome of a risky project is less than
what is proposed to the other two directors, i.e., y ≥ p2 + p3, director 1 would keep
the residual. Otherwise director 1 would guarantee the other two directors get what
was proposed, i.e., p2, p3, and keep 0 for himself. If no agreement is reached, then










outcome of safe project No Agreement
This means that: if an agreement is reached, pi is the proposal to director i. If no
agreement is reached in the end, pi is i’s reservation value.
Remark The reservation value might have different forms. In some situations, if the
new project is not selected by the board, the directors may just get the reservation
value from an ongoing project, and their values from this project could already be
revealed to each other. To simplify analysis, we explain the reservation value as the
share from a project with a public observed value on each director’s information, and
denote the share as r > 0, such that
∑
i r = 1.
In other situations, if no agreement is reached on the new proposed project, all
the directors might work on another new project. This might be proposed by others
or just be a safe project. Therefore, the reservation value could also depend on the
final outcome from this project. This also induces that the reservation values would
depend on all three directors’ types. In general, for any i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we denote these
reservation values as
ri(y|θ1, θ2, θ3) ≡ 1
3
[
1 + k(θ2, θ3|θ1)
]
However, in order to simplify the analysis and also make the point, we would assume
that the reservation value from this project is a third of the outcome from the new
project.
This assumption here is to simplify analysis. In general, what I need is: the share
of outcome from the safe project delivered to a minority director is no less than the
20
share delivered to director 2, which means a minority director could get more from no
agreement than director 2. The main result of this paper is that a majority director
will strictly prefer to collude with minority director. In this case, if a minority director
gets a smaller share on outcome of the safe project, then it is not surprising for a
majority director to collude with him, because he has a smaller reservation value. So
to make it interesting, I assume that the minority director and director 2 has the same
share from the outcome of the safe project. And in equilibrium, we have: majority
director will strictly prefer to collude with a minority director.
If we explain this reservation value as the return from another project (risky or
non-risky) which is proposed by another director if the agreement is not reached.
Then in this dynamic environment, the reservation value could also be explained
as the continuation value from no agreement of that project, see Wu (2013b) for
an environment in which this reservation value is endogenously determined as an
equilibrium result from continuation bargaining.
1.4.5 Information Sharing in the Majority Directors
In order to model information sharing in a group, we assume that after observing
signals but before board decisions, directors in the same group would share informa-
tion with each other. This means that director 2 would honestly report his signal
to director 1. We can think about this information sharing as an equilibrium out-
come of any communication game between director 2 and director 1. To support this
assumption, refer to Adams and Ferreira (2007) for a mechanism about information
transmission between board directors. In fact, this information sharing could be sup-
ported by any direct mechanism which induces truth telling. However, across the two
groups, there is no information sharing, i.e., there is bilateral asymmetric information
between director 3 and 2, but there is only one side asymmetric information between
21
director 3 and 1. To be more specific, we assume director 3 only knows that with
probability pi2, director 2 is a non-efficient type. For director 1 and 2, they know each
others’ type, but only know that with probability pi3, 3 is a non-efficient type in his
field.
We use information sharing among the group of inside directors as an example
because they, as “agents”, have very different interests than the outsiders. And the
tension between insiders and outsiders is the most important one in most boards
(e.g., Fama and Jensen (1983)). It might be easier for majority directors to share
information with each other. Empirically, this kind of information sharing among
them appears more prevalent and detrimental to the firm. However, this model can
possibly apply to any kind of division in the board.
All these are assumed to be common knowledge among all the directors. At the
beginning of the game, the above priors on the types are realized. After that, the
sequence of bargaining is the same as the one in the timing section.
1.4.6 How to Think of Proposals
In the previous section, we described the proposal in a very abstract way. This
abstraction could be mapped to different proposals in real board decisions. To demon-
strate the relation between the abstract and real world situations, we give a few
examples here.
In the first example, we can think about a proposal on the extension of a product
line. It is a very common board decision. In reality, the proposal might look like this,
In the next year, we need to set up a new research department and support
some new projects, e.g., iWatch and iCar. To fulfill this project, we need
to use $100,000,000 from our last year’s net profit to finance this new risk
project. Therefore, this year’s return to our shareholders may be limited.
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But our management needs more compensation to finish the risky project.
In this example, we can map this new research department plus the new projects to the
risky project in the proposal. The return to the shareholders and the compensations
can be mapped to the division of outcome from the risky project. Board directors’
choice on this project can be mapped to the action of Acceptance and Rejection on
this proposal.
The merge policy has the same features. When Microsoft merged with Nokia,
the stock price of Microsoft went down, but the stock price of Nokia went up. Then
the controlling shareholders who have both firms’ stock get positive benefit, but the
shareholders who only had Microsoft’s stock lost money. We can think about this
merge policy as the risky project, the return from stock market as the division of
outcome.
Another example is appointment of management. One famous example could go
back to Apple’s board decision in 1985. John Sculley, who was a board director and
CEO of Apple, proposed to the board:
. . . remove Jobs from his position as Apple Vice President and General
Manager of the Mac department. . .
Under this circumstance, the proposal is to remove Jobs from management position.
If the board directors had an agreement on this proposal, which is what happened
in 1985, Jobs would be removed from the position. This induces that the new risky
projects planned by Jobs would not be launched. Then shareholders would receive
return from another safe project. In 1985, after the decision of the board, Apple kept
on working with IBM to produce more products which were compatible with PC. We
can map this to the safe project in our model. Jobs chose to resign and quit Apple
and start up a new firm, NeXT. Several new projects launched in NeXT where the
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ones planned to launch in Apple, if Jobs has not been removed by the board. This
could be mapped to the risky project in our model.
The proposals in the real world could be more complicated than what is described
above. The bottom line is that proposals carry directors’ information; this informa-
tion would relate to the outcome of projects and also a division of outcomes. Some
directors may benefit from these proposals, some may not. And this raises the con-
flicts among board directors.
1.5 Benchmark
1.5.1 Benchmark I: Constant Reservation Value
In the benchmark, we first consider the case in which there is information sharing
among the directors in the same group, and all directors would get a constant value
from the safe project. The main result is:
Proposition 1. If the directors get constant value from no agreement, then for any
beliefs pii ∈ (0, 1), i = 2, 3 and any θ1, director 1 would form a coalition with the
directors with the lowest share from the safe project.
The intuition is that: First, by the majority rule, for the proposer, director 1,
he only needs to give a proposal to convince one of another two directors. Second,
there is only one dimension of uncertainty to director 1, the type of director 3. This
uncertainty only affects director 1’s expectation on the outcome, but nothing to his
cost of buying off any of the other two directors. Third, for director 2 and 3, they
would accept any offer which is at least as high as their reservation constant value;
and reject otherwise. Therefore, independent from the market belief, director 1 would
collude with the one with the lowest reservation value. This result is still true even
if there is no information sharing in the group. The key point is that the type
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independent reservation value would cancel out all the trade off caused by asymmetric
information.
1.5.2 Benchmark II: No Information Sharing
In this benchmark, we would consider the case in which the directors in the same
group would not share information with each other. The information structure is
defined as follows, i.e.,
Prob{θi = 0} = pii ∈ [0, 1] ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
Other than this, the game is exactly the same as the one described in the model
section. The main result is as follows.
Proposition 2. Given that there is no information sharing among the directors in
the same group,
• If return from the safe project is larger than the proposed risky project, and
director 2 has a better reputation of being efficient than director 3, i.e.,pi2 ≤ pi3,
director 1 would collude with director 2 by proposing in favor of him; or director
1 would collude with director 3 if director 2 has a relatively bad reputation of
being an efficient director, i.e., pi3 < pi2.
• If director 2 and 3 have the same market reputation, director 1 would be indif-
ferent between colluding with director 2 or director 3.
The intuition is that, by the majority rule, director 1 only needs to convince one
of the directors in 2 or 3. Since director 2 and 3’s types are private information,
director 1 has two choices. He could either gamble on the type of each director by
proposing a project which is only enough to cover the reservation value from a non-
efficient director; or he can pay a high cost to get a sure agreement. Obviously, the
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comparison between the two cases depends on the return from the safe project and
the benefit from the new proposed project. If the benefit from the safe project is
high enough and the cost to buy off the non-efficient director is low enough, director
1 would take the risk to give a proposal which is only enough to cover the reservation
value from the non-efficient director. Otherwise, director 1 would pay a higher cost
to get a sure agreement.
In the former case, director 2 and director 3 are not symmetric to director 1. This is
because their expectation from no agreement would depend on the other’s reputation
of being efficient. For instance, if director 3 has a relatively good reputation of being
efficient, i.e., pi3 < pi2, director 2’s expectation from no agreement would be higher
than the one from director 3. Thus, director 1 would collude with director 3. In the
latter case, the proposer will be indifferent between buying off any of the other two.
This is because the cost of buying off any of them is the same. This induces that it
would be indifferent for director 1 to buy off the other two. However, if we include
ideology into the preference, director 1 would strictly prefer to collude with his group
member, director 2. The idea is that, if the directors also value the ideology, then
given the same expected payoff from collusion, the proposers will prefer to buy off the
one with the similar ideology preference. Therefore director 1 will buy off his group
member in this case. If we reexplain director 2 as the CEO of the firm, and model
the turn over of CEO by the exclusion from the coalition or zero benefit from the new
proposed project, this result is consistent with current research on market reputation
and CEO turn over, see Milbourn (2003). But the intrinsic mechanisms are quite
different. In those papers, they emphasize the relation between CEO’s compensation
and market reputation. A low reputation induces a low wage compensation, so as the
probability of being retained in the position. However, our argument purely depends
on the internal interactions in the board and the conflicts among the board directors.
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1.6 Analysis of the Game: Information Sharing and Type Depend Reservation
Value
In benchmark I, we assumed that the safe project is independent from the di-
rectors’ types. In reality this may not be true. If the proposal of a new project is
rejected by the board, the board usually runs another project; it could be the one
proposed by other directors or another running project which would also be affected
by directors’ information. Thus, directors may not strictly prefer to collude with the
one with the lower share. It would depend on the real amount from the safe project.
In this section, we would show that if the directors’ reservation value depends on
directors’ types and directors in the same group share their private information, then
even if they have the same share, majority director 1 would strictly prefer to collude
with minority director 3.
Given the belief system,
Prob{θi = 0} = pii ∈ [0, 1] ∀i ∈ {2, 3}
The main results are as follows:
Main Results. There exist equilibria in which the majority director who can propose
would collude with the minority director who does not share information with him.
This result is supported by several other propositions. These propositions are
shown to be true by construction. The solution concept we are using is Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium and weakly dominance. The construction follows the logic of
backward induction. We first go through the interactions in the voting stage. Then
we go back to analyze majority director 1’s best response in the proposing stage.
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1.6.1 Analysis of Voting
We first go to the information set of voting game among all three directors. In
general, there might be many strategy profiles which could be Bayesian Nash equi-
librium in the sub-game of voting. This might complicate our analysis. In order to
simplify analysis in a reasonable way, we use the solution concept: weakly dominance
to restrict each director’s equilibrium strategies in the voting stage. A basic require-
ment is that a rational director would never choose weakly dominated actions in the
voting stage. Formally, we introduce the following definition:
Definition An action ai ∈ Ai ≡ {Y es,No} is weakly dominant for director i ∈
{1, 2, 3} in the voting, if for any a′i ∈ Ai (ai 6= a′i), a−i ∈ A−i and ~θ = (θ1, θ2, θ3)
ui(ai, a−i, ~θ|h) ≥ ui(a′i, a−i, ~θ|h)
with strict inequality for some a−i ∈ A−i, h = (p2, p3).
In other words, the “weakly dominant” requires that: given a proposal h = (p2, p3)
an action ai in the voting is optimal independently of what others know, which is
type/information ~θ observed by other directors, and what others do in voting a−i.
Follow this definition, we have our first prediction as follows,
Prediction 1:
In the voting stage, each director will
• accept any proposal which is larger than the reservation value given that the
uncertainty is realized as efficient type, i.e.,
For majority directors, they will accept any proposer which is at least as large
as r(y|θ1, θ2, θ3 = 1)
For minority, he will accept any proposer which is at least as large as r(y|θ1, θ2 = 1, θ3)
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• reject any proposal which is smaller than the reservation value given that the
uncertainty is realized as non-efficient type, i.e.,
For majority directors, they will reject any proposer which is no more than
r(y|θ1, θ2, θ3 = 0)
For minority director, he will reject any proposer which is no more than r(y|θ1, θ2 = 0, θ3)
The proposition supporting this prediction is as follow:
Claim 1. For any belief system {pii}i∈{2,3} in the sub-game of voting process, and for
any history h = (p2, p3),
1. Given a type profile (θ1, θ2) it is a weakly dominant action for the majority group
members, i ∈ {1, 2}, to accept any offer pi ≥ r(y|θ1, θ2, 1). And it is weakly a
dominant action for each of them to reject any offer pi < r(y|θ1, θ2, 0).
2. Given a θ3, it is a weakly dominant action for the minority director to accept
any offer p3 ≥ r(y|θ1, 1, θ3). And it is a weakly dominant action for each of
them to reject any offer p3 < r(y|θ1, 0, θ3). Here, pi is the proposal to director i
and r is i’s reservation value from no agreement.
The intuition of this result is as follows. Majority rule induces that director i’s
action matters if and only if the other two’s actions are split, which means the other
two directors have different actions in the voting. Therefore, given a proposal, if
director i could get more utility from acceptance, then it is weakly dominant for him
to accept. Meanwhile, if director i could get more utility from rejection, then it is
weakly dominant for him to reject.
To illustrate the idea of this proof, let us take majority director 2 as an example.
Figure 1 demonstrates director 2’s utility from different voting strategy profiles. We
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Figure 1.1: Weakly dominant of Acceptance
minority director is efficient; and define r ≡ r(y|θ1, θ2, 0), which is reservation value
from no agreement given that minority director is non-efficient. The horizontal line,
p2, is the proposal to director 2. For any proposal which is larger than r¯, if the
other two directors choose to reject, then given a proposal h and any information
obtained by each director, (θ1, θ2, θ3), director 2’s action will not change the voting
result. Majority rule induces that no agreement will be reached. For director 2, if he
is efficient type, he would get r.
For any proposal which is larger than r¯, if the other two directors choose to accept,
then given a proposal h and any information obtained by each director, (θ1, θ2, θ3),
director 2’s action will not change the voting result. Majority rule induces that: agree-
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Figure 1.2: Weakly dominant of Rejection
However, if one of the other two directors chooses to reject and the other of the
two chooses to accept, then director 2’s action would affect the outcome of voting. If
director 2 chooses to accept, then majority rule induces an agreement, director 2 gets
p2. If he chooses to reject, then majority rule induces no agreement in the voting,
and director 2 gets reservation value r¯ or r. From figure 1, it is easy to check that,
for any proposer less than r, we always have
u2(A;A,R|h, ~θ) ≥ u2(R;A,R|h, ~θ)
Then follow the definition, we would say: it is a weakly dominant action for the
majority director 2 to accept any proposal which is larger than r(y|θ1, θ2, 1).
For the rejection part, let us refer to figure 2. The coordinates and notations
are the same as the previous analysis. For any proposal which is less than r, if the
other two directors choose to reject, then given a proposal h and any information
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obtained by each director, (θ1, θ2, θ3), director 2’s action will not change the voting
result. Majority rule induces that no agreement will be reached. For director 2, if he
is non-efficient type, he would get r. If he is an efficient type, he would get r¯.
For any proposal which is less than r, if the other two directors choose to accept,
then given a proposal h and any information obtained by each director, (θ1, θ2, θ3),
director 2’s action will not change the voting result neither. Majority rule induces
that agreement will always be reached. Then director 2 would always get what was
proposed, p2.
However, if one of the other two director chooses to reject and the other of the
two choose to accept, then director 2’s action would affect the outcome of voting. If
director 2 choose to accept, then majority rule induces an agreement, director 2 gets
p2. If he chooses to reject, then majority rule induces no agreement in the voting,
and director 2 gets reservation value r¯ or r. From figure 2, it is easy to check that,
for any proposer less than r, we always have
u2(R;A,R|h, ~θ) ≥ u2(A;A,R|h, ~θ)
Then follow the definition, we would say: it is weakly dominant action for the majority
director 2 to reject any proposal which is less than r(y|θ1, θ2, 0).
For the other two directors’ optimal decisions in the voting stage, the same logic
will be applied. This proposition is equivalent to the following expression:
Corollary 1. For any belief system {pii}i∈{2,3} in the sub-game of voting process, and
for any history h = (p2, p3),
1. Given a type profile (θ1, θ2) it is a weakly dominated action for the majority
group members, i ∈ {1, 2}, to reject any offer pi > r(y|θ1, θ2, 1). And it is a
weakly dominated action for each of them to accept any offer pi ≤ r(y|θ1, θ2, 0).
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2. Given a θ3, it is weakly dominated action for the minority director to reject any
offer p3 > r(y|θ1, 1, θ3). And it is weakly dominated action for each of them to
accept any offer p3 ≤ r(y|θ1, 0, θ3). Here, pi is the proposal to director i and r
is i’s reservation value from no agreement.
1.6.2 Analysis of Proposing
Now let us go to the proposing stage. We are going to analyze majority director
1’s best response at his information set. We use Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium as the
solution concept. Formally we introduce the following definition:
Definition A proposal (p∗2, p
∗
3) and voting strategies form a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium, if there exists a belief system such that,
• Director 1’s proposal is optimal for each type, given the strategies in the voting.
• Given the belief, all directors’ voting strategies respond optimally to each other
and every proposal.
• In equilibrium, weakly dominated actions are not allowed in the voting stage.
• Beliefs associated with equilibrium strategy satisfy Bayes rule.
One additional requirement here is that, in equilibrium, given proposals from the
proposing stage, each director’s equilibrium actions in voting stage can not be weakly
dominated. This simply requires that, for each director, any proposal less than r
should be rejected, and any proposal larger than r¯ should be accepted, no matter
what happened, what others know, and what others do in voting.
Before going to the decision problem of majority director 1, let us first show the
following argument is true.
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Lemma 1. The majority director 1’s expected payoff is decreasing with the total
proposal, p2 + p3, given to the other two directors.
The intuition is that when the total proposal increases, on one hand, the probabil-
ity of getting a positive residual will decrease; on the other hand, the residual kept by
the majority director who can propose will also decrease. Then with the assumption
7 in the set up, the expected payoff will decrease too.
The above result can be proved to be true in a more general case, if we relax the
assumption as follows,
When the total proposal is over the return, the proposer always get a non-
positive payoff.
The intuition is that, when the proposal increases, other than what is mentioned
above is true, we also have the following result: the probability of getting a non-
positive payoff will be increasing, and because the payoff is non-positive, this induces
that the expected payoff will decrease more.
Now, let us go to the information set of director 1, we are going to characterize
equilibria which maximizes his expected payoff. Our prediction is:
Prediction 2:
If a minority director has a good reputation of being expertise, the ma-
jority director who can propose will collude with a minority director by
proposing in favor of him. Majority directors’ information may not be
revealed and agreement may not be reached.
This is the most surprising result of this paper. Two equilibria would support this
prediction. In these results, the majority director 1 would strictly prefer to collude
with the minority director who does not share information with him.
7When the total proposal is over the return, the proposer always get a zero payoff.
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For the majority director who has proposal power, director 1, the basic trade-off
is:
1. He can give a proposal in favor of other majority directors who shared informa-
tion with him. In this case, agreement will be reached and a new policy/project
will be launched. However, he can give a proposal in favor of the minority
director, but he might face the risk of no agreement.
2. If he proposes in favor of the minority director, another trade-off is to reveal
their information to the minority director or manipulate the minority director’s
belief through proposal. For instance, if a majority director is an efficient type,
he might have incentives to conceal information to lower the minority director’s
expectation from no agreement. This would induce a low cost of collusion.
If the minority director’s information could induce high reservation value, he
would also take the risk of no agreement and propose a low offer to the minority
director.
The next result will support the argument I made in the introduction: The majority
director would collude with a minority director by proposing in favor of him.
Proposition 3. If an efficient minority director contributes more in a safe project
than in a risky project, s.t., for all θ1, θ2
k(θ2, 1|θ1)− ρµ(θ2, 1|θ1)︸ ︷︷ ︸














w(pi2, 0|θ2) = pi2r(y|θ1, 0, θ3 = 0) + (1− pi2)r(y|θ1, 1, θ3 = 0)
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First it is easy to prove that the decision problem of the majority director who can
propose can be transferred to the comparison among the costs of different proposals.
If he chooses to collude with the other majority director, director 2, he only needs to
pay director 2’s reservation value from no agreement. Since the minority director’s
information is not realized, director 2’s expectation would be based on the minority
director’s market reputation, pi3. And the cost of colluding with director 2 would be,
for all θ1, θ2
C2(pi3|θ1, θ2) = pi3r(y|θ1, θ2, 0) + (1− pi3)r(y|θ1, θ2, 1)
This reads as follows: with probability pi3, the minority director is a non-efficient
type, and because there is no private information between majority directors. So,
in order to reach an agreement, the proposer only needs to pay r(y|θ1, θ2, 0). With
probability 1 − pi3, the minority director is an efficient type, then the cost would be
r(y|θ1, θ2, 1).
If the majority director chooses to collude with a minority director, one choice
is to give a proposal, which supposes that the minority director is an efficient type.
Since director 2’s information is not revealed to the minority director, the minority
director’s expectation from no agreement would be based on the other majority di-
rector’s market reputation pi2. This offer would induce an agreement for sure. This
cost would be, for all θ1
C3(pi2|θ1, θ3 = 1) = pi2r(y|θ1, 0, 1) + (1− pi2)r(y|θ1, 1, 1)
Another choice is to give a proposal, which supposes the minority director is a non-
efficient type. If it is lucky, i.e., with probability pi3 he faces a non-efficient minority
director, then the majority director only needs to pay
pi2r(y|θ1, 0, 0) + (1− pi2)r(y|θ1, 1, 0)
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and agreement will be reached. Otherwise, with probability 1 − pi3, there would be
no agreement. This is because the minority director is an efficient type, and he has a
higher reservation value. This cost of no agreement can be divided to two parts, the
first part is the return from agreement, which is
e+ ρµ(θ2, 1|θ1)
It is just the outcome from a risky project, endowment plus return. The second part
is the return from no agreement, which is r(y|θ1, θ2, 1). This is just the outcome from
a safe project, or the continuation value from no agreement. By giving this lower
level offer, the majority director would fail to get the first part but, would get the
second one. Combine these two, we have the cost of no agreement as,
C3(pi2, pi3|θ2, θ3 = 0) =pi3
Cost of agreement︷ ︸︸ ︷[




e+ ρµ(θ2, 1|θ1)− r(y|θ1, θ2, 1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of No agreement
For convenience, we use
L(θ2) ≡ e+ ρµ(θ2, 1|θ1)− r(y|θ1, θ2, 1)
to denote the cost of no agreement.
Now, I am going to use some figures to demonstrate why the argument is true. The
horizontal line is the market belief on the minority director’s type, which is pi3. The
vertical line is cost of collusion. Here, r(y|θ1, 1, 1) is reservation value for an efficient
director 2, given that the minority director is also an efficient type. r(y|θ1, 1, 0) is
reservation value for an efficient director 2, given that the minority director is non-
efficient. r(y|θ1, 0, 0) is reservation value for a non-efficient director 2, given that the










C 3(π2,π3∣θ2=1,θ3=0)     and    L (θ2=1)>r (y∣θ1,1,1) ,∀π2
C 3(π2,π3∣θ2=1,θ3=0)     and    L (θ2=1)≤r (y∣θ1,1,1) ,∀π2
Cost
Figure 1.3: Cost for θ2 = 1
From the previous analysis, we know that the cost depends on a majority director’s
type, so we will go through the two types. The equilibrium I just described has the
feature of polling information, which means that majority director 1 gives the same
proposal for director 2 of a different type. Therefore, if we find a common choice for
director 2 in a different type, then this choice could be the candidate of equilibrium.
Given this candidate, we only need to check if we have a belief system to support it
as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
If majority director 2 is an efficient type, i.e., θ2 = 1, then the black line is
the cost to collude with the other majority director, given that he is efficient. It is
the expectation across the minority director’s market belief, given that director 2 is
efficient. If the majority director tries to gamble on the minority director’s type, then
the location of cost line would depend on the cost of no agreement, which is denoted







C 3(π2,π3∣θ2=0,θ3=0)    and    L (θ2=0)≤r (y∣θ1, 0,1) ,∀π2
C 2(π3∣θ2=0)




Figure 1.4: Cost for θ2 = 0
indicate the cost of colluding with a non-efficient minority director. This means, if
director 3 is non-efficient, i.e., pi3 = 1, the cost to get an agreement is the expectation
on director 2’s market belief.
If the cost of no agreement L(θ2 = 1) is larger than r(y|θ1, 1, 1), which is the cost
of colluding with the other majority director, given that the minority is efficient, then
we have this blue cost line. It is easy to see that for any pi2, which means we can move
the blue line along this yellow interval, with some value of pi3, the cost of colluding
with a minority director is less than the cost of colluding with the other majority
director. However, if the cost of no agreement, L(θ2 = 1), is less than r(y|θ1, 1, 1),
then we have this red cost line. We can see, for any pi2 ∈ (0, 1) and pi3 ∈ (0, 1), the
cost of colluding with a minority director is less than the cost of colluding with the
other majority director. Now let us go to the case in which majority director 2 is a
non-efficient type, i.e., θ2 = 0. We use the dashed line to indicate the cost. We use
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the same coordinate as before. This black dashed line is the cost to collude with the
other majority director, given that he is non-efficient. It is the expectation across the
minority director’s market belief, given director 2 is non-efficient.
If the majority director tries to gamble on the minority director’s type, then the
location of the cost line would also depend on the cost of no agreement, L(θ2 = 0),
and also the market belief of director 2, pi2. It moves on the yellow line with different
market belief pi2. As the previous case, the points on the yellow line indicate the cost
of colluding with a non-efficient minority director. This means, if director 3 is non-
efficient, i.e., pi3 = 1, then the cost to get an agreement is the expectation on director
2’s market belief. If the cost of no agreement L(θ2 = 0) is larger than r(y|θ1, 0, 1),
which is the cost of colluding with a non efficient majority director 2, given that the
minority is efficient, then we have this dashed blue cost line. It is easy to see that for
any pi2, which means we can move the blue line along this yellow interval, and any
pi3, the cost of colluding with the minority director is larger than the cost of colluding
with the other majority director. If the cost of no agreement, the L(θ2), is less than
r(y|θ1, 0, 1), i.e., the cost of colluding with the other majority director, given that the
minority is efficient. Then we have this dashed red cost line. We can see, for any
pi2 ∈ [0, 1], there exist some pi3 under which the cost of colluding with the minority
director is less than the cost of colluding with the other majority director. Recall the
previous case of θ2 = 1, it is easy to check that in order to support the argument,
we need the cost of no agreement, L(θ2), to be less than the cost of colluding with
the other majority director, given that the minority is efficient. This is demonstrated
by the black and red lines. The continuous line is for θ2 = 1, the dashed line is for
θ2 = 0. The next step is to check the location of cost of colluding with minority
director given that he is efficient. It is just the expectation across director 2’s market
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C 3 (π2∣θ3=1)  ∀π2
Figure 1.5: Cost for all θ2
cost is above all the red lines for any pi2 ∈ [0, 1] and any pi3 ∈ [0, 1]. Given all these
cost lines, we get that, for any pi2 ∈ [0, 1], and any pi3 less than pi∗, it would be the
best response for the majority director who can propose to collude with the minority
director by gambling on him as a non efficient type. It is because this proposal always
induce the lowest cost of collusion.
We can further prove that there exists a belief system to support the above pro-
posal as an equilibrium which satisfies the equilibrium requirement we defined before.
From above analysis, we also observe that the prediction can also be supported
by another equilibrium. Recall that if majority director 2 is an efficient type, and
director 1 chooses to gamble on the minority director being non-efficient, then the
cost of collusion is this continuous blue line. It is easy to check that, for any pi3 larger
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C 3 (π2∣θ3=1)  ∀π2
π** (π2)
Figure 1.6: Cost for all θ2
If majority director 2 is non efficient, and the cost of no agreement L(θ2 = 0) is less
than r(y|θ1, 1, 0), then the cost of colluding with the minority director by gambling on
him as non-efficient is this dashed red line. And for any pi2 ∈ [0, 1] and pi3 less than pi∗,
this proposal would induce the lowest cost. Put the two cases together. It is easy to
check that, under some conditions, for any pi2 ∈ [0, 1], there exist pi∗∗ < pi∗, such that
it would be the best response for the majority director who can propose to collude
with the minority director by gambling on him as a non efficient type, which means
give a proposal equal to the minority director’s expectation from no agreement. This
intuition is summarized by the following proposition:
42
Proposition 4. If, for all θ1, condition Z(pi2, e, ρ) is true, and










then there exists 0 < pi∗∗ < pi∗ < 1, s.t., for all θ2, pi3 ∈ (pi∗∗, pi∗), it is best response








w(pi2, 0|θ2) = pi2r(y|θ1, 0, θ3 = 0) + (1− pi2)r(y|θ1, 1, θ3 = 0)
Z(pi2, e, ρ) is a condition to guarantee pi
∗∗ < pi∗.
We want to emphasize some features of this result. First, the information sharing
might hurt directors in the majority group, in the sense that the majority director
who can propose would collude with a minority director by proposing in favor of
him. Second, this result indicates that the bargaining may not be efficient in the
sense that there might be no agreement between the board directors. Third, majority
directors’ information will not be revealed. Fourth, from the view of production, a
less productive project might be finally selected.
Prediction 3:
There is no other equilibrium inducing majority director to collude with
a minority director.









C 3(π2,π3∣θ2=1,θ3=0)     and    L (θ2=1)>r (y∣θ1,1,1) ,∀π2
Cost
C 3(π2∣θ3=1)  ∀π2
π2→0
π2→0
Figure 1.7: Cost for all θ2
Proposition 5. If for all θ1, θ2
k(θ2, 1|θ1)− ρµ(θ2, 1|θ1)︸ ︷︷ ︸







then for all pi2, pi3 ∈ (0, 1), there is no equilibrium, s.t., the proposer will collude with
a minority director
The idea of the proof is as follows. We use the same coordinates as the previous
analysis to support this result. If this condition is satisfied, it is equivalent that the
cost of no agreement, L(θ2) for all θ2 ∈ {0, 1}, is larger than the cost of colluding
with the other majority director. This is true for any pi2 ∈ [0, 1], and pi3 ∈ [0, 1].
And the cost of colluding with a minority director, given that he is an efficient type,
is also larger than the cost of colluding with the other majority director. The green
line is above the dashed black line. If director 2 is efficient, it is possible the cost of
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colluding with a minority director is smaller than other cases. However, in equilib-
rium, majority director will not collude with a minority director. First, an efficient
majority director can not conceal info by proposing in favor of the minority director.
This is because, a non-efficient majority director will never collude with a minority
director. The dashed blue line is always above the dashed black line. Second, if only
the efficient majority collude with a minority director, then in equilibrium the type
will be perfectly revealed, which means a minority director knows that with proba-
bilty 1 θ2 = 1, if he gets a positive proposal. This induces a high level cost for director
1. Both the blue line and the green line will move above to the black line. Therefore,
majority director 1 would only prefer to collude with the other majority director.
The more subtle issue here is that a different expectation on the outcome would
perfectly reveal the true type of director 2. This would change minority director 3’s
belief on director 2’s type. Therefore, it would induce a higher cost to collude with
the minority director. However, the cost of colluding with his group member, director
2, would always be the same. Thus, it would always be the best response to collude
with his group member.




The above analysis is true for a wide range of beliefs, i.e., pii ∈ (0, 1). However,
if we move the value of belief to extreme case, in which pi3 → 0 and pi2 → 1, the
equilibrium result would be different. This extreme belief system reads as: director
3 has a reputation of being an efficient type and director 2 has a reputation of being
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a bad type. Given this belief system, director 2’s expectation would put high weight
on the high level outcome, but director 3 would put high weight on the low level
outcome. This induces that the cost to include the another majority director to the
coalition is higher than the cost of including the minority directors in the coalition.
To summarize this intuition, we have the following result:
Claim 2. For all θ2, if pi3 → 0 and pi2 → 1, then there exist an equilibrium in which it
is the best response for director 1 to include director 3, the minority, in the coalition.
This proposition is another point to support the argument that the information
sharing might hurt directors in the same group. If we think about director 2 as
the current management, such as the CEO, and director 3 as a candidate for the
replacement of current management, then one message delivered in this proposition
is that: Market reputation on directors’ type might induce an inefficient outcome of
production in the sense that an efficient current management might be replaced by
an non-efficient candidate.
One immediate implication from this result relates to CEO turn over in a modern
firm. Recall the famous case of Apple in 1985. The board fired the CEO, Steve Jobs,
who was director of the board at that time, and the new management, John Sculley,
was supported by the board as the new CEO. The above result explains this as follows:
the previous performance of Steve Jobs lowered the market evaluation of his ability.
This induces that with a high probability Steve might be a non-efficient type, even
though he is in fact an efficient type. But the asymmetric information blocks our eyes
from seeing the truth. Meanwhile, John Sculley’s previous performance in Pepsi gave
him a reputation of being an efficient type, even though in fact he was not. According
to a previous result, their market reputation changes the board’s expectation on the
final outcome. Steve Job’s reputation induces a relative low cost of making John
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Sculley a coalition member.
1.7.2 Risks of the Project
From the previous analysis, we know that the equilibria results depend on the
probability that the proposed project is good, ρ. It is easy to see that when ρ → 1,
i.e., probability of getting a good project is high, then the condition
k(θ2, 1|θ1)− µ(θ2, 1|θ1) ≥ 1
2
[
1 + µ(θ2, 1|θ1)
]
would never be true; however, condition
k(θ2, 1|θ1)− µ(θ2, 1|θ1) < 0 < 1
2
[
1 + µ(θ2, 1|θ1)
]
would always be satisfied. Therefore, if we explain director 2 as the management,
it is obvious that the information sharing is good to both the management and the
aligned board directors, in the sense that they all get their preferred project. Rational
directors anticipate this benefit, then they would both prefer a less independent board,
which would allow them to share information.
Now, if we let ρ → 0, i.e., the probability of getting a good project is low, then
the return from the current safe project is not high enough. Then it might only be
true that
k(θ2, 1|θ1) < 1
2
for some θ1, θ2
then, the board would not propose a project in favor of the management. Now we
introduce the following assumption
k(0, 1|1) < 1
2
, k(θ1, 1|0) < 1
2
∀θ1 and k(1, 1|1) > 1
2
If we explain majority director 1’s type as an investment he financed, then this con-
dition reads as: A safe project with low investment or a high investment with lazy
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inside directors, θ2 = 0, all induce a low return from the safe project. However a high
level investment with efficient supervision and efficient management would induce a
relatively high return.
Under this assumption, our results imply that, given a low level investment, the
management may not prefer a less independent board. Meanwhile, a board with a
non-efficient inside director 2, θ2 = 0, may not prefer a less independent board. How-
ever, if the investment is high, the management is efficient and the inside director also
provides accurate information then the management would prefer a less independent
board. This is because, based on our theory, the management would always get the
preferred project.
To summarize the above analysis, we have the following result,
Claim 3. If the probability of the good project is high, then the management would
prefer a less independent board. However, if the probability of the good project is low,
then
• given the return or the NVP from the current safe project is low, then the
management would not prefer a less independent board.
• or given the return or the NVP from the current safe project is high, then the
management would also prefer a less independent board.
To our knowledge, this implication has not been discussed in the literature. A
related result is from Song and Thakor (2006) which shows that when the probability
of good projects is low, then the board will be biased toward underinvestment. Our
results try to connect the board structure to the project selection. For the empirical
test, it might be a good idea to check the data of board structure during economic
booms and economic downturns. To support our results, we hope the data shows us
48
that during economic booms, a less independent board would be selected, however,
during the economic downturns, another board structure would be selected.
1.8 Discussion and Implications
In this part, we want to do comparisons between the results of three models.
In the first benchmark model, the proposer’s optimal decision would depend on the
share delivered to each director, and the one with the lower share would always be
preferred. However, this result may not be true if we allow the directors to affect
the production. This feature is especially true when we focus on the advisory rule
of the board directors. To support this argument, we assume that the share to each
director in the safe project is the same, but the results indicate that the proposer
would never be indifferent between the other two directors. The key point here is
that information sharing induces different expectations of return to each director.
Then, even if the directors have the same share on the safe project, they still might
have different expectations on the real outcome from a safe project. Therefore, the
proposer would strictly prefer to collude with one of them, i.e., propose a project in
favor of one of them.
In the second benchmark model, the proposer would either prefer to collude with
his group member or to collude with the one with a good reputation of being an
efficient director. However, this result may not be true after considering information
sharing within a group. Our results indicate that the proposer may also collude with
the director who does not have a good reputation of being efficient. Meanwhile,
after information sharing, it may never be the best choice for the director to get
an agreement for sure, i.e., it would be optimal for him to take a risk to gamble
on the minority director’s type and collude with him with a low cost. This also
induces that after information sharing, for the proposer, it may never be indifferent
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between colluding with his group member and the minority. Our results also have
implications to current research in corporate finance. The most related two topics
are friendly board and CEO turn over.
1.8.1 Directors Information and Board Structure
Fist of all, we can think of the minority director as an outside director. The
main result says: If the outside directors can bring information/knowledge to board,
and the information can affect the firm’s performance, then the shareholders will be
protected, even if they only have minority position in board.
If we focus on the advisory role of the corporate board, this model implies that the
number of the outside directors may not be the key. What really matters is the infor-
mation provided by the outside directors. If the information provided by a minority
director is more productive in a safe or the safe project. The outside investors or mi-
nority shareholders will be protected. At the same time, the asymmetric information
may actually protect the minority director and the represented shareholders.
Think about one of the majority directors who is a gray director and he is aligned
with management. Then this model tells us that: Boards still can protect shareholders
if they include some gray directors who have a conflict of interest, but also bring some
information to the board, especially if the boards also have outside directors whose
information is more productive/influential. A similar implication was also presented
in Baranchuk and Dybvig (2009), even though it comes from the cooperative view.
If we think about the new risk project as a firm’s R&D, it implies that the conflicts
in the board may actually block R&D. Meanwhile, the project/policy proposed may
not be the one inducing the highest expected outcome.
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1.8.2 Friendly Board —information Sharing Between the Management and Board
In this model, we do not exactly specify each directors’ role in the firm. If we
explain the proposer, director 1, as the one who represents the largest portion of the
shareholders and director 2 as the CEO of the firm, our results imply that friendly (or
passive) boards may be preferred by the shareholders and the majority of the board.
A similar question has been studied recently in the theoretical literature, e.g., Adams
and Ferreira (2007). However, the underground mechanisms are quite different. Our
theory explains as follows, a passive board might prefer to select a project or policy in
the favor of the CEO. Therefore, the CEO would have incentive to share information
with the board directors to benefit himself in the board decisions. Meanwhile, this
selection would also be preferred by the shareholder, because this would also maximize
the shareholders’ expected payoff from the selection of the new project or policy.
Another more surprising message delivered here is that the information sharing
may not necessarily benefit the management. Under some conditions this would
only be beneficial to the largest proportion of the shareholders. In some sense, the
information sharing might hurt the management. This could be a non-efficient result
induced by information sharing.
1.8.3 Market Reputation and CEO Turn over
In the current literature, research already argue that: On the one hand, for higher
evaluation of CEO ability, there is a greater likelihood that the incumbent CEO will
stay in position. On the other hand, if the initial evaluation of the incumbent CEO’s
ability is low, then the likelihood of being retained in the position is also low, see
Milbourn (2003).
However, our results want to argue that, after considering the interactions in
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the board, this may not be the case. If we explain director 2 as the current CEO,
director 3 as the candidate of the new CEO, and director 1 as the representative
of the largest shareholders who also controls the CEO turn over by project (policy)
selection, then our results predict that: First, the CEO turn over might both depend
on the reputation of the incumbent and the entrant. Our results say that: if the
market has low evaluation on the incumbent CEO’s ability, but it does not have high
evaluation on the candidate CEO’s ability either, then the incumbent CEO might
be retained in the position. Second, the board might not keep the CEO with high
market evaluation on ability. Meanwhile, the board might also keep the CEO even if
the market has low evaluation of his ability.
1.9 Conclusion
The research status quo has left the working of the board as a black box 8 . What
they do has been extensively studied, but not how they do it. How do boards function?
What are the mechanics by which they do their jobs? These are the questions raised
by the survey papers such as John and Senbet (1998), Hermalin and Weisbach (2001),
Adams et al. (2008). Every time, however, there were no satisfactory answers. This
paper steps into the black box, though a small step, by modeling complex, economic
tensions inside the board. In this section, let us summarize our main findings and
point out some extendible assumptions.
The main message delivered in this paper is as follows. Unlike previous research on
corporate governance which emphasizes majority positions for the outside directors
in the board, our main result says: if directors who represent minority shareholders
could provide expertise or information in production, especially if these directors
8Only a few theory papers touch on the topic of tensions within the board (e.g., Harris and Raviv
(2008) on board control; Galai and Wiener (2008) on power sharing).
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also have a good reputation of expertise, then minority shareholders can actually
be protected from expropriation by controlling shareholders, even if they only have
minority position in board.
Some of our modeling assumptions deserve further discussion. First, we assume
that the members representing shareholders of the same interest only share infor-
mation before board room decisions. However, sometimes, directors with the same
interest also help members to coordinate actions. It would be interesting to inves-
tigate how this function would affect directors’ actions and boardroom decisions. A
plausible conjecture is that the coordination might give some benefits to the directors
who shared information. To support this result, there might be some inside trans-
fers or some fiduciary responsibility to force the majority director to fulfill this job.
However this does not necessarily contradict the results in our model. Because the
leaderships’ benefit still might be hurt in this case.
Second, in this model, we only consider one shot negotiation among the direc-
tors. However, in real board decisions, they might negotiate more than one round.
Therefore, a model with multi-round negotiation might be a better description of the
board decisions. But this might induce a very complicated signaling process, see Wu
(2013b) on an attempt of two rounds negotiation.
Some points in this paper also need further support. One key feature of our model
is that the directors with the same interest would share information. From newspaper
and anecdotes, we have numerous stories to support this assumption. For instance,
in the Walmart’s Mexican Bribery Scandal, the so called “gray” directors and the
management share information with each other, and get a new project passed and
built in Mexico. However, all these are descriptive, we need more precise and detailed
evidence about the information they shared and how they formed the coalition. This
could help us to better understand the interactions among the board directors. Based
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on this situation, methods from experiment economics might be useful, see Gillette
et al. (2008) for an attempt on the laboratory study on the boardroom communication.
Appendix
In this part, we give the complete proof of main propositions. The notations are
the same as the setup of the model.
Claim 4. For any belief system {pii}i∈{2,3} in the sub-game of voting process, and for
any history h = (p2, p3),
1. Given a type profile (θ1, θ2) it is weakly dominant action for the majority group
members, i ∈ {1, 2}, to accept any offer pi ≥ r(y|θ1, θ2, 1). And it is weakly
dominant action for each of them to reject any offer pi < r(y|θ1, θ2, 0).
2. Given a θ3, it is weakly dominant action for the minority director to accept any
offer p3 ≥ r(y|θ1, 1, θ3). And it is weakly dominant action for each of them to
reject any offer p3 < r(y|θ1, 0, θ3). Here, pi is the proposal to director i and r is
i’s reserved value from no agreement.
Proof. To simplify analysis, we first introduce the following notations:
r¯ ≡ r(y|θ1, 1, θ3) = r(y|θ1, θ2, 1)
r ≡ r(y|θ1, 0, θ3) = r(y|θ1, θ2, 0)
The two equalities are induced by the anonymity assumption.
For any proposal h = (p2, p3), if the other two directors choose the same actions
in the voting, i.e., either both choose “Yes” or both choose “No”, then for director
i ∈ {2, 3}, we have




i, aˆ ∈ {Y es,No} and ai 6= a′i. This is becuase majority rule induces that
director i’s action will not affect the result of voting.
However, if the other two directors choose different actions in the voting, i.e.,
one chooses “Yes”, the other chooses “No”, then majority rule induces that director
i ∈ {2, 3} will be pivotal in the voting. If director i gets a proposal pi ≥ r¯, and he
chooses “Yes”, then we have
ui(Y es; aˆ, aˆ
′, ~θ|h) ≥ ui(No; aˆ, aˆ′, ~θ|h)
where ai, a
′
i ∈ {Y es,No} and ai 6= a′i. Strictly inequality holds for any proposal
pi > r¯. Recall the definition of weakly dominance, then we have: it is weakly dominant
for director i ∈ {2, 3} to accept any proposal which is no less than r¯.
If director i ∈ {2, 3} gets a proposal pi < r¯, and he chooses “No”, then we have
ui(No; aˆ, aˆ
′, ~θ|h) > ui(Y es; aˆ, aˆ′, ~θ|h)
where ai, a
′
i ∈ {Y es,No} and ai 6= a′i. Recall the definition of weakly dominance,
then we have: it is weakly dominant for director i ∈ {2, 3} to reject any proposal
which is less than r.
For director 1, the same argument will be applied. The only difference is that:
if the return has a stochastic form, there is uncertainty on director 1’s residual.
Therefore, director 1 would take expectation on the proposal. From the set up, we
know that, with some probability, the realized outcome is less than the proposal given
to the other two director, p2 + p3, director 1 would get 0. However, if the realized
outcome is large than p2 + p3, director 1 would take the residual.
Lemma 2. The majority director 1’s expected payoff is decreasing with the total
proposal, p2 + p3, given to the other two directors.
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Proof. We define the total proposal given to directors 2 and 3 as z, i.e., z = p2 + p3.
Let 0 ≤ z′ ≤ z, then for any θ1, director 1’s expectation on the residual is
g(z′|θ2, θ3) =
∫













The first inequality is determined by the following facts. For any z′ ≤ z, we always
have y − z ≤ y − z′ and
Prob{z < y|θ2, θ3} ≤ Prob{z′ < y|θ2, θ3} ∀θ2, θ3
Since for all θ2, θ3 and z ≥ 0, we always have
Prob{z < y|θ2, θ3} ≤ 0
Then we have above result.
Proposition 6. If directors get constant reservation value from no agreement, then
for any beliefs pii ∈ (0, 1), i = 2, 3 and any θ1, director 1 would form a coalition with
the directors with the lowest share from safe project.
Proof. First, we can prove that: it is weakly dominate action for each director to
accept any proposal which is no less than his reservation value, and it is weakly
dominate action to reject any proposal which is less than his reservation value. Here
we denote these reservation values as ri ∈ (0, 1), such that
∑
i ri = 1. The proof is
a special case of Claim 1, such that, for each director i, r¯i = ri.
9 Therefore, the
equilibrium proposal would be one of the ri.
9Under this set up, each director could have different r¯ and r, so we use subscript i to denote the
difference.
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There is no information sharing between directors in the same group, director 1’s
information is publicly revealed, and each director’s reservation value is fixed, there-
fore director 1’s decision problem is simply do comparison among all the reservation
values. The lowest reservation value would induce the highest expected payoff to
director 1. It is obvious that this decision would be independent from each director’s
market reputation.
Proposition 7. Given that there is no information sharing among the directors in
the same party,
• If return from safe project is larger than the proposed risky project, and director
2 has better reputation of being efficient than director 3, i.e.,pi2 ≤ pi3, director 1
would collude with director 2 by proposing in favor of him; or director 1 would
collude with director 3 if director 2 is in relative bad reputation of being an
efficient director, i.e., pi3 < pi2.
• If director 2 and 3 has the same market reputation, director 1 would be indif-
ferent between collude with director 2 or director 3.
Proof. First of all, the analysis of voting game is similar to Claim 1. We have it is
weakly dominate action for each director to accept any proposal which is at least as
large as r¯, and it is weakly dominate action for each director to reject any proposal
which is no more than r.
Now, we go to director 1’s information set. In this set up, director 2 and 3’s reser-
vation values depends on each other’s type which is private information. Therefore,
in order to get an agreement. Director 1 first needs to choose a director to collude
with. Second, he needs to decide the amount given to that director. He has two
choices. The first is to give a proposal given that this director is efficient type. Under
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the proposal, agreement will be reached for sure. The second choice is to gamble on
director 2 or 3’s type, and give a proposal which is the same as the reservation value
of a non-efficient type.
One trivial case is that director 2 and 3 have the same market belief, then they
are symmetric to director 1. Therefore it would be indifferent for director 1 to choose
either of them. He only need to decide the amount of the offer.
Now, we go to the non-trivial case in which director 2 and 3 have different market
reputation. If director 1 gives a proposal
pijr(y|θ1, 0, 1) + (1− pij)r(y|θ1, 1, 1)
to collude with director i ∈ {2, 3}, where j 6= i and j ∈ {2, 3}, which is director i’s
reservation value given that he is efficient type. Then director 1’s expected utility is
V −
(



















which is the expectation on the outcome of a risky project.
If director 1 gives a proposal
pijr(y|θ1, 0, 0) + (1− pij)r(y|θ1, 1, 0)
to collude with director i ∈ {2, 3}, where j 6= i and j ∈ {2, 3}, which is director














ρµ(1, 1|θ1)− r(y|θ1, 1, 1)
)]
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Manipulate the algebra, we find that if it is true that
ρµ(θ2, θ3|θ1) < r(y|θ1, θ2, θ3)
then the proposal which is equal to the reservation value of non-efficient director
would induce a higher collusion cost. This further induces that director 1 would give
director i a proposal equal to
pijr(y|θ1, 0, 1) + (1− pij)r(y|θ1, 1, 1)
This is also the cost of colluding with director i, we can rewrite it as
r(y|θ1, 1, 1)− pij
[
r(y|θ1, 1, 1)− r(y|θ1, 0, 1)
]
Given this expression, it is easy to check that: this cost is increasing with pij. This
means that the cost of colluding with director i is lower than the cost of colluding
with director j, if pii ≤ pij. Now we have proved this proposition.
Proposition 8. If efficient minority director contributes more in reserved project
than risky project, s.t., for all θ1, θ2
k(θ2, 1|θ1)− ρµ(θ2, 1|θ1)︸ ︷︷ ︸














w(pi2, 0|θ2) = pi2r(y|θ1, 0, θ3 = 0) + (1− pi2)r(y|θ1, 1, θ3 = 0)
Proof. Now, we go to director 1’s information set. First of all, director 1’s decision
problem can be transferred to the comparison among the cost of colluding with dif-
ferent directors. Director 1 has three choices and the basic trade-off is: he can give a
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proposal in favor of other majority directors who shared information with him. In this
case, agreement will be reached for sure and a new policy/project will be launched.
However, he can also give a proposal in favor of the minority director, but he might
face the risk of no agreement in this case. If he proposes in favor of the minority
director, another trade-off is: to reveal their information to the minority director or
manipulate the minority director’s belief through proposals. For instance, if director
2 is efficient type, director 1 might have incentives to conceal this information, and
pretend to be non efficient type, this could lower minority director’s expectation from
no agreement. And also lower the cost of collusion.
If he chooses to collude with the other majority director, director 2, he only needs
to pay director 2’s reservation value from no agreement. And agreement will be
reached for sure. Since minority director’s information is not realized, director 2s












pi3r(y|θ1, θ2, 0) + (1− pi3)r(y|θ1, θ2, 1)
)
If director 1 chooses to collude with minority director, one choice is to give a
proposal, which supposes that the minority director is efficient type. Since director
2’s information is not revealed to minority director, minority director’s expectation
from no agreement would be based on the other majority director’s market reputation












pi2r(y|θ1, 0, 1) + (1− pi3)r(y|θ1, 1, 1)
)
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Another choice is to give a proposal, which supposes the minority director is non-
efficient type. If it is lucky, i.e., with probability pi3 he faces a non-efficient minority
director, agreement will be reached with offer which is at least




pi2r(y|θ1, 0, 0) + (1− pi3)r(y|θ1, 1, 0)
)
Otherwise, no agreement will be reached, director 1 gets his reservation value, which
is
r(y|θ1, θ2, 1)





























e+ ρµ(θ2, 1|θ1)− r(y|θ1, θ2, 1)
])
It is easy to check that, the parts before the minus symbol are the same for all the
three cases. The only differences are on the parts after the minus symbol. We call
these are cost of collusion, and introduce the following notations:
C2(pi3|θ1, θ2) = pi3r(y|θ1, θ2, 0) + (1− pi3)r(y|θ1, θ2, 1)
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which is the cost of colluding with director 2 would be, for all θ1, θ2.
C3(pi2|θ1, θ3 = 1) = pi2r(y|θ1, 0, 1) + (1− pi2)r(y|θ1, 1, 1)
which is the cost of colluding with director 3, given that he is efficient, for all θ1.
C3(pi2, pi3|θ2, θ3 = 0) =pi3
Cost of agreement︷ ︸︸ ︷[




e+ ρµ(θ2, 1|θ1)− r(y|θ1, θ2, 1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of No agreement
which is the cost of colluding with director 2, given that he is non-efficient, for all θ1.
The explanation of this third cost is as follows: If it is lucky, i.e., with probability pi3
director 1 faces a non-efficient minority director, then the cost to director 1 is
pi2r(y|θ1, 0, 0) + (1− pi2)r(y|θ1, 1, 0)
and agreement will be reached. Otherwise, with probability 1 − pi3, there would be
no agreement. This cost of no agreement can be divided to two parts, the first part
is the return from agreement, which is
e+ ρµ(θ2, 1|θ1)
It is just the outcome from risky project, endowment plus return. The second part is
the return from no agreement, which is r(y|θ1, θ2, 1). This is just the outcome from
safe project, or the continuation value from no agreement. By giving this lower level
offer, the majority director would fail to get the first part but get the second one
instead.
To support the argument, we need to find a condition to guarantee that
C3(pi2, pi3|θ2, θ3 = 0)
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is the smallest among all the three costs, and it should be true independently from
director 2’s type. For convenience, we use
L(θ2) ≡ e+ ρµ(θ2, 1|θ1)− r(y|θ1, θ2, 1)
to denote the cost of no agreement.
1. First we want to argue that: for any θ1, θ2, θ3, the relation between C2(pi3|θ1, θ2)
and C3(pi2, pi3|θ2, θ3 = 0) depends on the value of cost of no agreement, L(θ2).
This is supported by the following arguments.
From expression of each cost, we know that, for any θ2, C2(pi3|θ1, θ2) is decreas-
ing with minority director’s market belief, pi3. This is because r(y|θ1, θ2, ) −
r(y|θ1, θ2, 1) < 0. And it is also true that:
r(y|θ1, θ2, 0) ≤ C2(pi3|θ1, θ2) ≤ r(y|θ1, θ2, 1)
For any θ2, C3(pi2, pi3|θ2, θ3 = 0) could be either decreasing or increasing with
minority director’s market belief, pi3 . It depends on the values of L(θ2) and
director 2’s market belief pi2. If it is increasing with pi3, this cost reaches the
maximal value when pi3 = 1, and we have, ∀pi3 ∈ [0, 1], , and given θ2 = 1,
C3(pi2, pi3 = 1|θ2 = 1, θ3 = 0) =pi2r(y|θ1, 0, 0) + (1− pi2)r(y|θ1, 0, 1)
≤r(y|θ1, 0, 1) = r(y|θ1, 1, 0)
≤C2(pi3|θ1, θ2 = 1)
However, if it is decreasing with respect to pi3, and L(θ2 = 1) ≤ r(y|θ1, 1, 1),
then we also have ∀pi3 ∈ [0, 1]
C3(pi2, pi3 = 1|θ2 = 1, θ3 = 0) ≤ C2(pi3|θ1, θ2 = 1)
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This is because, ∀pi2,
maxpi3C3(pi2, pi3|θ2 = 1, θ3 = 0) ≤ maxpi3C2(pi3|θ1, θ2 = 1)
and
minpi3C3(pi2, pi3|θ2 = 1, θ3 = 0) ≤ minpi3C2(pi3|θ1, θ2 = 1)
and both are linear in pi3.
If L(θ2 = 1) > r(y|θ1, 1, 1), then there exists a pi∗, such that, for any pi3 ∈ [0, pi∗]
C3(pi2, pi3|θ2 = 1, θ3 = 0) ≥ C2(pi3|θ1, θ2 = 1)
and for any pi3 ∈ [pi∗, 1]
C3(pi2, pi3|θ2 = 1, θ3 = 0) ≤ C2(pi3|θ1, θ2 = 1)
This is because, when L(θ2 = 1) > r(y|θ1, 1, 1), we have, ∀pi2,
maxpi3C3(pi2, pi3|θ2 = 1, θ3 = 0) ≥ maxpi3C2(pi3|θ1, θ2 = 1)
and
minpi3C3(pi2, pi3|θ2 = 1, θ3 = 0) ≤ minpi3C2(pi3|θ1, θ2 = 1)
These induce that there exist a point pi∗∗, such that, for any value left to pi∗∗,
colluding with minority director is more costly than colluding with majority
director 2. However, for any value right to pi∗∗, colluding with majority director
2 is more costly than colluding with minority director. Above analysis is for
the case of θ2 = 1. In order to support the result, we will go through the case
of θ2 = 0.
The same as the case of θ2 = 1, C3(pi2, pi3|θ2 = 0, θ3 = 0) could be either de-
creasing or increasing with minority director’s market belief, pi3 . It depends
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on the values of L(θ2) and director 2’s market belief pi2. If L(θ2 = 0) ≥
r(y|θ1, 0, 1) = r(y|θ1, 1, 0), it is easy to check that C3(pi2, pi3|θ2 = 0, θ3 = 0)
is decreasing with pi3, and this cost reaches the maximal value when pi3 = 0,
and we have, ∀pi3 ∈ [0, 1], , and given θ2 = 0,
C3(pi2, pi3|θ2 = 0, θ3 = 0) ≤ C2(pi3|θ1, θ2 = 0)
This is because, ∀pi2,
maxpi3C3(pi2, pi3|θ2 = 0, θ3 = 0) ≥ maxpi3C2(pi3|θ1, θ2 = 0)
and
minpi3C3(pi2, pi3|θ2 = 0, θ3 = 0) ≥ minpi3C2(pi3|θ1, θ2 = 0)
and both are linear in pi3.
However, if If L(θ2 = 0) < r(y|θ1, 0, 1) = r(y|θ1, 1, 0), then we have that: there
exists a pi∗, such that, for any pi3 ∈ [0, pi∗]
C3(pi2, pi3|θ2 = 0, θ3 = 0) ≤ C2(pi3|θ1, θ2 = 0)
and for any pi3 ∈ [pi∗, 1]
C3(pi2, pi3|θ2 = 0, θ3 = 0) ≥ C2(pi3|θ1, θ2 = 0)
This is because, when L(θ2 = 1) < r(y|θ1, 0, 1) = r(y|θ1, 1, 0), we have, ∀pi2,
C3(pi2, pi3 = 0|θ2 = 1, θ3 = 0) ≥ C2(pi3 = 0|θ1, θ2 = 1)
and
C3(pi2, pi3 = 1|θ2 = 1, θ3 = 0) ≤ C2(pi3 = 1|θ1, θ2 = 1)
These induce that there exist a point pi∗, such that, for any value right to pi∗,
colluding with minority director is more costly than colluding with majority
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director 2. However, for any value left to pi∗, colluding with majority director 2
is more costly than colluding with minority director.
Combine above analysis, one conjecture is that: as long as it is true that, for
any θ2,
L(θ2) ≤ r(y|θ1, θ2, 1)
then there exists a pi∗ ∈ (0, 1), such that, for any pi3 ∈ [0, pi∗], director 1 max-
imizes his expected utility by colluding with minority director and give a pro-
posal which is the same as the minority director’s reservation value from no
agreement, given that minority director is non-efficient.
To check the conjecture, we only need to check: for any pi2 and given L(θ2) ≤
r(y|θ1, θ2, 1), it is true that
C3(pi2, pi3|θ2 = 1, θ3 = 0) < C3(pi2|θ3 = 1)
It is easy to check as long as L(θ2) ≤ r(y|θ1, θ2, 1), we always have, for any
θ2, θ3, it is true that,
C3(pi2, pi3 = 0|θ2, θ3 = 0) = L(θ2) ≤ r(y|θ1, θ2, 1) = C3(pi3 = 0|pi2|θ3 = 1)
and
C3(pi2, pi3 = 1|θ2, θ3 = 0) ≤ r(y|θ1, 0, 1) = r(y|θ1, 1, 0) = C3(pi3 = 1|pi2|θ3 = 1)
Because these costs are linear in pi3, so the conjecture is true.
2. Above analysis is on the equilibrium path, to complete the proof, we also need
to check off equilibrium path. If director 1 deviates to any other proposals
(p′2, p
′




where w(pi2, 0|θ2) ≡ pi2r(y|θ1, 0, 0) + (1− pi2)r(y|θ1, 1, 0).
If director 1 deviates to (p′2, p
′
3) = (pˆ, 0), where pˆ > 0, in order to get an
agreement, the pˆ needs to be at least as large as director 2’s reservation value.
The cost of doing this is C2(pi3|θ1, θ2). Previous analysis already shows that this
cost is higher than the equilibrium proposal.
If director 1 deviates to (p′2, p
′
3) = (0, pˆ), where pˆ 6= w(pi2, 0|θ2), follow the
definition of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium defined in the paper, we need to
specify the posterior belief of minority director. This is because, director 1’s
proposal might change minority director’s belief about director 2’s type. To
support the equilibrium, we assume that for any proposal (p′2, p
′
3) = (0, pˆ) where
pˆ 6= w(pi2, 0|θ2), minority director’s belief on director 2’s type is
Prob{θ2|(p′2, p′3)} = pi ∈ (pi2, 1]
This means that if minority director gets an offer which is positive but is dif-
ferent from the equilibrium proposal, then minority director believes that the
probability of facing a non-efficient director 2 will increase, i.e., pi > pi2.
Now, we are going to prove that, given above off equilibrium path belief, director
1 has no incentive to deviate. If he deviates to any proposal no less than
pi2r(y|θ1, 0, 1)+(1−pi2)r(y|θ1, 1, 1), which is minority director’s reservation value
from no agreement given that he is efficient type, minority director would accept
the proposal for sure. From previous analysis, we know that, for any belief pi2,
this proposal would induce higher cost than the equilibrium proposal.
Now let us go to deviations between 0 and pi2r(y|θ1, 0, 1) + (1− pi2)r(y|θ1, 1, 1),
but different from w(pi2, 0|θ2). For any proposals satisfying these condition, the
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cost of colluding with minority director is
C3(pi, pi3|θ2, θ3 = 0) =pi3
[




e+ ρµ(θ2, 1|θ1)− r(y|θ1, θ2, 1)
]
It is easy to check that, for any pi > pi2, it is true that,
C3(pi, pi3|θ2, θ3 = 0) =pi3
[












e+ ρµ(θ2, 1|θ1)− r(y|θ1, θ2, 1)
]
=C3(pi2, pi3|θ2, θ3 = 0)
Therefore director 1 has no incentive to deviate. One key condition inducing this
equilibrium is
L(θ2) ≤ r(y|θ1, θ2, 1) ∀θ2
which is equivalent to






Now we have proved this proposition.
Proposition 9. If, for all θ1, condition Z(pi2, e, ρ) is true, and











then there exists 0 < pi∗∗ < pi∗ < 1, s.t., for all θ2, pi3 ∈ (pi∗∗, pi∗), it is best response








w(pi2, 0|θ2) = pi2r(y|θ1, 0, θ3 = 0) + (1− pi2)r(y|θ1, 1, θ3 = 0)
Z(pi2, e, ρ) is a condition to guarantee pi
∗∗ < pi∗.
Proof. One key condition to support the previous equilibrium is
L(θ2) ≤ r(y|θ1, θ2, 1) ∀θ2
From previous analysis, we know that, fix all other conditions, but change one
condition to
L(θ2 = 1) > r(y|θ1, θ2 = 1, 1)
then there exist a point pi∗∗, such that, for any value left to pi∗∗, colluding with
minority director is more costly than colluding with majority director 2. However,
for any value right to pi∗∗, colluding with majority director 2 is more costly than
colluding with minority director.
Recall previous analysis, one conjecture is that: as long as pi∗∗ < pi∗, there is one
equilibrium under which director 1 will propose in favor of minority director. Next
step is to find if there exists such condition.
First, pi∗ can be determined by
C3(pi, pi3|θ2 = 0, θ3 = 0) = C2(pi3|θ2 = 0)
and pi∗∗ can be determined by
C3(pi, pi3|θ2 = 1, θ3 = 0) = C2(pi3|θ2 = 1)
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Manipulate the algebra, we get
pi∗ =
r(y|θ1, 0, 1)− L(θ2 = 0)
r(y|θ1, 0, 1)− L(θ2 = 0) + (1− pi2)
[




L(θ2 = 1)− r(y|θ1, 0, 1)
L(θ2 = 1)− r(y|θ1, 0, 1) + (1− pi2)
[
r(y|θ1, 0, 1)− r(y|θ1, 0, 0)
]
It is easy to check, as long as
L(θ2 = 1)− r(y|θ1, 0, 1) ≤ r(y|θ1, 0, 1)− L(θ2 = 0)
we have pi∗∗ < pi∗. We denote above condition as condition Z(pi2, e, ρ).
The analysis off equilibrium path is the same as previous proposition, we use the
same belief to support this as an equilibrium.
Proposition 10. If for all θ1, θ2
k(θ2, 1|θ1)− ρµ(θ2, 1|θ1)︸ ︷︷ ︸







then for all pi2, pi3 ∈ (0, 1), there is no equilibrium, s.t., the proposer will collude with
minority director
Proof. From previous analysis, we know that if it is true that
L(θ2) > r(y|θ1, θ2, 1) ∀θ2
then director 1 will not collude with minority director if θ2 = 0. This is because the
cost of colluding with minority director is the lowest one among the three possible
cases. If director 2 is efficient, it is possible that for some pi3, the cost of colluding with
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minority director is less than other cases. However, in equilibrium efficient director 2
will not collude with minority director. This is because, if director 2 is efficient, then
director 1 will never collude with minority director. Therefore, if director 1 proposes
in favor of minority director, the minority will infer that director 2 is efficient, then
pi2 = 0. This would further induce a higher expectation on reservation value. The
cost of colluding wit minority director changes to be
C3(pi2 = 0, pi3|θ2 = 0, θ3 = 0) =pi3r(y|θ1, 1, 0) + (1− pi3)
[
e+ ρµ(θ2, 1|θ1)− r(y|θ1, 1, 1)
]
≥pi3r(y|θ1, 0, 1) + (1− pi3)r(y|θ1, 1, 1)
=C2(pi3|θ1, θ2 = 1)
if director 1 tries to gamble on minority director being a non-efficient type. Or, the
cost changes to be
C3(pi2 = 0, pi3|θ3) = r(y|θ1, 1, 1) ≥ pi3r(y|θ1, 0, 1) + (1− pi3)r(y|θ1, 1, 1)
= C2(pi3|θ1, θ2 = 1)
if director 1 tries to give a proposal given that minority director is an efficient type.
Therefore, colluding with director 2 will be the best choice for director 1. Now, we
have proved this proposition.
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Chapter 2
INFORMATION HURTS: DO PARTIES REALLY BENEFIT THEIR MEMBERS?
2.1 Introduction
Political parties are an instrumental aspect of legislative politics. They help politi-
cians achieve their goals, whether these goals are to hold office or whether they are
legislative goals. A vast literature has explored how parties help politicians achieve
each of these goals.
In the formal literature, the idea that political parties help politicians win office
goes back, at least, to Downs (1957). Downs viewed political parties as providing a
‘brand name’ for politicians. This idea was formalized by Alesina and Spear (1987)
Alesina (1988), Cox and McCubbins (1993), Snyder Jr and Ting (2002), and Ashworth
and de Mesquita (2008). Alesina and Spear (1987) and Alesina (1988) point to a
different mechanism by which parties can help politicians win reelection: Because
parties are long-lived organizations, they can help short lived politicians commit to
implementing electorally attractive policies.
The literature has pointed to two mechanisms by which political parties help
politicians achieve their legislative goals. One idea, that goes back to Schwartz (1986)
and Aldrich (2011) is that parties help members form winning coalitions and, thereby,
pass legislation. ( Jackson and Moselle (2002) can be viewed as a formalization of this
idea.) A second idea, formalized by Levy (2004), is that parties help party members
commit to particular policies and thereby implement legislation desired by the party
members.
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From the informational perspective, politicians are always treated as policy ex-
pertise. Each of them might possess some information which is about the relationship
between policies and their consequences Krehbiel (1992). And one important way in
which parties help politicians achieve their legislative goals is by serving as a mecha-
nism for sharing these information among party members. For instance, in the United
States, Whips helps the party leadership collect information about party members.
Smith et al. (2011) report:
... [Party] leaders can sometimes pry information from members, lobby-
ists, and others who want something from them. The whip system and
party task forces are often activated to gather and disseminate informa-
tion. ... By exercising care in granting access to their information, party
leaders can affect the strategies of other important players. (Page 157-158)
The idea that information sharing between politicians may help them achieve their
legislative goals is also applicable to a more general class of political factions. For
instance, in many Communist parties, such as in The Soviet Union or in China, party
members are forced to make reports to the party on a monthly basis. The leadership
also encourages members to report information of other party members. For instance,
the Constitution of the Communist Party of China requires party members to reveal
their personal characteristics publicly. Article 5 requires that:
Party members who recommend an applicant must make genuine efforts
to acquaint themselves with the applicant’s ideology, character, personal
record and work performance . . .
In practice, the informational constraints are met by members reporting, not to the
party leadership, but to their political factions within the party; see Huang (2006).
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The fact that parties (or, more generally, political factions) serve as a mecha-
nism to share information amongst party members is documented in the qualitative
literature, e.g., Smith et al. (2011). The formal theory literature has not investi-
gated the impact of information sharing on legislative outcomes. At first glance, the
effect of information sharing on legislative outcomes may appear positive: By shar-
ing information, party members can more easily propose and pass legislative policies
that achieve the legislative goals of the party and, in particular, are preferred by all
party members. But, in this paper, I show that there is a second—and potentially
detrimental—effect. Sharing information may induce conflicts between politicians of
the same party and thereby hurt certain party members.
The main result of this paper establishes that this detrimental effect of information
sharing can indeed occur. To establish this, I study the effect of information sharing on
distributive politics. I propose a new legislative bargaining model that incorporates
the idea that there may be information sharing amongst party members. Absent
information sharing, the party leadership will provide legislative pork to their party
members. However, with information sharing, there may exist conflicts between party
members. This may result in a decreased level of legislative pork for certain party
members. Thus, information sharing may be detrimental for (some of) the party’s
own members. This conclusion stands in contrast to the conventional wisdom that
parties help their party members achieve legislative goals.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a preview of the main
assumptions of the model and provides an intuition for the main result. Section 2.3
presents the model. Section 2.4 analyzes the benchmark model. Section 2.5 analyzes
the main model and gives the main result. Finally, I conclude the paper by discussing
several extendable assumptions. The appendix contains all the proofs.
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2.2 Preview of the Approach
This section gives a description of the model. The goal is to explain key assump-
tions and to give an intuition for the main result.
The paper focuses on distributive politics. There are three politicians divided into
two parties: A majority party and a minority party. One member of each party is
designated as the party leader. In the first period, the leader of the majority party
makes a proposal of the level of pork each politician receives. The politicians vote
to accept or reject the proposal. The proposal passes if a majority of the politicians
vote to accept. If not, the proposal is rejected and a party is randomly recognized
to make a new proposal. The leader of the party is the one to actually make the
proposal. Again, the politicians vote to accept or reject the new proposal. If the new
proposal is also rejected, then the game is over, and they divide the pie equally.
Each politician is associated with a type, which is a private signal obtained by
the politician. Every signal carries a piece of information about the consequence of a
spcified policy. When parties engage in information sharing, the types are commonly
known within the parties, but are private information across parties. One way to
think of these signals is that each politician is a policy expertise, and the budget is
composed of consequences of a bundle of policies. The signals from different policies
will influence the expected size of the budget. For instance, one politician might be
an experter on the trade policy with China or he might get some private news from
some lobbyists. In this case, he might know exactly what is the consequence of that
trade policy, but this information is difficult to be observed by others. However, when
parties engage in information sharing, the politicians within a party would credibly
communicate their information only to other party members.
Let us take note of some important features of the model. First, ideological politics
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are absent from this model. This is striking given that ideology is often seen as a
key feature of party politics. But, in fact, as highlighted in the Introduction, parties
serve many other roles. The goal here is to focus on the role of information sharing.
So I abstract away from ideological politics. That said, it is, of course, important
to ensure that the analysis is robust to introducing policy preference. Later, I will
discuss some choices in the formal analysis that are meant to ensure this form of
robustness.
Second, politicians make proposals about the level of pork to be distributed. That
is, politicians bargain over the dollar amount. For instance, the proposer will make
an offer of legislative pork in the form of a promise to build a bridge, to give money
for education, etc. He offers these concrete objects (or dollar amounts) instead of
simply offering a share of the total ex post budget.
In a world of complete information, bargaining over the dollar amount is equivalent
to bargaining over the share of the pie. So, while typical formulations, e.g., Rubinstein
(1982) or Baron and Ferejohn (1989), study models where bargainers negotiate over
the share of the pie, their model is equivalent to one in which bargainers negotiate over
dollar amounts. But, this need not be the case when there is asymmetric information.
In this case, bargainers may have different expectations about the size of the pie, and
these different expectations may correspond to different expected shares of the pie.
For example, suppose one politician expects the budget (i.e., the level of legislative
pork) to be 100 million dollars and another politician expects the budget to be 200
million dollars. If the first politician offers the second politician 50 million dollars,
then the first believes she is making an offer of half the pie, while the second believes
she received an offer of one quarter of the pie. Assuming that the bargainers negotiate
the share of the pie misses an important strategic implication that arises from this
mismatch of beliefs.
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In practice, politicians do make offers in terms of dollar amounts and not shares
of the pie. Many Appropriations Bills exceeds the President’s budget request or the
previous year’s funding. 1 This should not happen if politicians bargain over the
share of the pie. But, if they bargain over the dollar amount, this is certainly a
possibility.
The fact that there is uncertainty about the budget introduces an important
strategic consideration: A politician may offer a proposal that turns out to exceed
the budget. If this happens, I assume that the proposer can secure funds for the
dollar amounts (or projects) that have been promised to other politicians but cannot
secure the funds for his own projects. That is, if the proposer promised a bridge to
a legislator, he must deliver on that bridge. In practice, committees do request an
extension of the budget to fulfill projects. Likewise, Congress does try to request an
extension of the budget from the President.
Although the model allows for the proposal to go over budget, the equilibrium
I solve for has the feature that the proposer makes an offer that does not go above
budget, i.e., for any realization of the politicians’ types. Thus, the proposer ensures
that he also receives legislative pork.
2.2.1 Summary of Results
I consider two variants of the model: One where parties do not engage in infor-
mation sharing and a second where they do engage in information sharing.
In the benchmark model, there is no information sharing, and politicians’ types
1As evidence to support this fact, I give two examples: First, in the fiscal 2004 La-
bor/HHS/Education Appropriations Bill,The Labor/HHS Bill contained 1,951 projects, an 8 percent
increase over last year’s 1,805 projects. The projects cost $943 million, 16 percent less than the $1.1
billion in 2003. In addition, 100 percent of the 1,951 earmarks lacked a budget request, and 99.9
percent or 1,950 earmarks were added in conference. Second, In 2006, Yazoo Basin projects are
receiving 63.3 percent more than the state of Mississippi received from the entire Energy and Water
bill in fiscal year 2005 and have exceeded the President’s fiscal 2006 budget request of 28,920,00 by
188 percent.
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are private information. Thus, each politician has the same expectation about the
level of pork available to distribute. There is an equilibrium where the leadership
of the majority party ‘buys off’ his own party member and they reach immediate
agreement. In one such equilibrium, the leadership offers his own party member one-
third of the expectation of the pie, and this is exactly what his party member expects
to get in the second period, independent of who makes the second-period proposal.
There is another such equilibrium where the leadership offers his own party member
only one-sixth of the expectation of the pie, as this is exactly what his party member
expects to get in the second period.
Importantly, there is also an equilibrium of this game where the leadership of the
majority party ‘buys off’ the member of the minority party and they reach immediate
agreement. But, in any such equilibrium, the leadership must be indifferent between
between buying off his party member vs. the non-party member. For instance, in any
second-period sub-game, there is an equilibrium where each politician—other than
the leadership of the majority party—expects to get one-third of the pie. This makes
it equally costly for the leadership of the majority party to ‘buy off’ his own party
member vs. non-party member in the first-period. But, in a slight perturbation of
the game where the leadership has partisan preferences, he would strictly prefer to
buy off his own party member.
Now add the feature of information sharing. The result is quite different: Within
the party, the party members have the same information about the expected level of
the budget. But, this information is not shared across parties. Thus, politicians from
different parties will have different expectations about the level of pork to distribute
and this mismatch of expectations can make it cheaper for the leadership to buy off
the minority party member in the first period.
The key is that because the members of the majority party have the same expec-
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tations about the size of the pie, it is strictly cheaper for the leadership to buy off his
own party member in the second period. As such, if the leadership of the majority
party is to reach immediate agreement, it is cheaper to buy off the minority party
member earlier on, as the minority party member’s expected future benefit is lower.
Let us understand why, in the second period, it is cheaper for the leadership to
buy off his own party member. First, consider the case where at least one member of
the majority party received bad news about the size of the budget. In this case, each
majority member has a lower expectation about the outside option, i.e., disagreement,
than the member of the minority party. Thus, it is more expensive to buy off the
minority party member. The more subtle case is when both members of the majority
party receive good news about the size of the budget. Suppose, contra hypothesis,
that, in this case, it is cheaper to buy off the minority party member vs. a majority
party member. Then, in this case, the minority party member will infer, from the
fact that she was offered a proposal, that both the majority party members received
good news. Thus, her expectation of the outside option cannot be lower than the
expectation of the majority party members, contradicting the hypothesis that it is
cheaper to buy off the minority party member vs. a majority party member.
Note, carefully, this equilibrium is robust with respect to a slight perturbation of
the game where the leadership has partisan preferences: When the majority party
leader makes a first-period offer to the minority party member, the offer is a unique
best response (for the majority leader). As a consequence, even if we perturb the
game to give the majority party member small partisan incentives to make offers to
his own party member, the equilibrium would still obtain.
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2.2.2 Related Literature
This paper connects to a large existing literature. I now turn to discuss some
connections.
Internal Organization of Political Parties: The bulk of the literature on political
parties treats the parties as a black-box; that is, they do not delve into the internal
workings of the party. This paper moves away from that standpoint. It looks at
a feature of how parties operate—namely, by information sharing. Recently, some
researchers have explored a different aspect of the internal workings of the party—
namely, internal party competition. Caillaud and Tirole (2002) focus on how party
competition influences the ‘image’ of the party and the general election. Persico et al.
(2011) focus on how factional competition within the party affects the persistence of
policy and public spending.
Bargaining in Stochastic Environments: A number of papers focus on bargaining in
political environments where the size of the pie is stochastic. See Merlo and Wilson
(1995), Eraslan and Merlo (2002), and Diermeier et al. (2003). In that literature, the
size of the pie is determined anew in each period by a sequence of random shocks.
That is, the size of the pie tomorrow may differ from the size of the pie today. In
each period, all politicians have the same expectation about the size. In my paper,
the size of the pie is fixed. Nonetheless, the expected size of the pie may differ from
one period to another, in so far as offers made early on influence the beliefs about
the size of the pie in later periods. This fact raises a conflict between the politicians’
expectations about the size of the pie.
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Information Sharing in Oligopoly Markets: There is related literature on “informa-
tion sharing” in oligopoly markets. The literature was pioneered by Novshek and
Sonnenschein (1982), Clarke (1983) and Vives (1984). The main theoretical results
are summarized in Vives (2001). The idea is that industry-wide agreements allow
firms to exchange information about costs, demand conditions etc. They ask whether
information sharing increases or reduces expected profits. This paper shares some
common features with that literature, but the voting process here is part and parcel
of the political application.
2.3 The Model
There are three politicians, which are denoted by a set {1, 2, 3}. They are divided
into two parties, L = {1, 2}, which is called the majority party, and R = {3}, which
is called the minority party. We refer to politician 1 as the leadership of the majority
party. Each politician i ∈ {1, 2, 3} either gets a piece of good news viz. θ¯, or a bad
news, viz. θ, where θ¯ > θ. We assume that the type θi is private information to each
politician. The prior on the type is
Prob{θi = θ¯} = 1
2
∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
This probability is commonly known by all politicians and the types are independently
distributed.
In each period, one politician gives a proposal. And after that all the politicians
vote to Accept or Reject the proposal. Majority rule determines the voting results.
Here, the proposal is the level of pie which will be distributed to the other two
politicians. The pie is an output of a linear technology,
y = x+ 
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] is a random variable. The size of pie y is not realized until
the end of the game.
Politician’s type is the signal about the size of the pie. Good news is assumed to
indicate a large size of pie and the bad news is assumed to indicate a small size of pie.
The signals only affect the expectation on the size of pie through the random variable
, in the sense that the type profile (θ1, θ2, θ3) is the parameters of the distribution
of . Specifically, I am going to assume  is a random drawn from a continuous CDF
which is conditional on type profiles (θ1, θ2, θ3):
F (|(θ1, θ2, θ3)) =
∫
f(|(θ1, θ2, θ3))d ∀θi ∈ {θ, θ¯}
We further assume that the politicians’ information are anonymous to the proba-
bility distribution. In other word, it does not matter who has the good news on what
policy, only the number of good news matters; or equivalently, only the number of
bad news in the type profiles matters. For instance, if both politicians 1 and 2 have
good news on their specialized policies and 3 has bad news on his specialized policy,
then we have the same distribution on  as the case in which politician 1 and 3 have
good news on their specified policies and 2 has bad news on his specified policy. From
this assumption, we can simplify the eight possible type profiles to four, which are
(θ, θ, θ);
(θ, θ, θ¯) = (θ, θ¯, θ) = (θ¯, θ, θ);
(θ, θ¯, θ¯) = (θ¯, θ, θ¯) = (θ¯, θ¯, θ);
(θ¯, θ¯, θ¯)
Another assumption I want to introduce is that, the expectation on the  is bounded





≥ E(|θ¯, θ¯, θ¯) ≥ E(|θ, θ¯, θ¯) ≥ 0 ≥ E(|θ, θ, θ¯) ≥ E(|θ, θ, θ) ≥ −x
4
The idea here is that, high type always induce high expectation on the size of pie.
2.3.1 Timing
For clarity of the sequential decision, we turn to the timing of the game.
In the first period , t=0,
1. Nature determines the realization of each politician’s type and distribution of
the random variable . These realizations are privately observed by the politi-
cians.
2. The majority party leadership, politician 1, gives a proposal (p2(h
0), p3(h
0)),












where h0 is the information set, after which politician 1 gives a proposal. 3x/2
is the largest realization of the pie.
3. After seeing the proposal, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} votes on the proposal simultaneously.
Voting strategy is a mapping from i’s information set to {Accept, Reject}.
4. Majority rule determines the result. If at least two choose to accept, then game
over, the proposal is implemented. Otherwise, they go to the second period.
2From now on, we are going to use EX(X|θ1, θ2, θ3) to denote the expectation of random variable
X conditional on type profile (θ1, θ2, θ3).
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In the second period , t=1,
1. With probability 1/2, each party is recognized as the new proposer in the second
period. If the majority party is recognized, we assume only the leadership has
the right to give proposals.













where j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, but i 6= j 6= k. h1 is the information set, after which
politician i gives a proposal in the second period.
3. After seeing the proposal, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} votes on the proposal simultaneously.
Voting strategy is a mapping from i’s information set to {Accept, Reject}.
4. Majority rule determines the result. If at least two choose to accept, then game
over, the proposal is implemented. Otherwise, they all get a third of the realized
pie.
As mentioned in the preview section, the proposals might be over the budget, i.e.,
larger than the realization of y, then we assume that proposer i always gets money








where the discount factors δ ∈ (0, 1), t ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. If an agreement is
reached, pti is the proposal to i at time t. If no agreement is reached in the end, p
t
i is
a third of the realized y. If i is proposer and proposal is over the budget, pti = 0.
2.3.3 Information Sharing in a Party
In order to model information sharing in a party, we are going to assume politician
1 and 2’s types are public information within the majority party, but it is private
information across parties. And also, 3’ type is private information across parties. To
be more specific, I am going to assume: 3 only knows
Prob{θ1 = θ¯} = 1
2
and Prob{θ2 = θ¯} = 1
2
1 and 2 know
Prob{θ3 = θ¯} = 1
2
and all these are assumed to be common knowledge among all the politicians. At the
beginning of the first period, the above priors on the types and the distribution on
the  are realized. After that the sequence of bargaining is the same as the one in the
timing section.
2.4 Benchmark
As a benchmark, we assume that no party engages in the information sharing, i.e.,
there is no information sharing between politicians in the same party. The information
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structure is the same as the one defined in the model set up, i.e.,
Prob{θi = θ¯} = 1
2
∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
Other than this, the game is exactly the same as the one described in the model
section.
The main result of the benchmark model is as follows. There exists one equilib-
rium, such that, if the majority party has the proposal power, then the majority party
leadership is going to buy off his party member. Thereby an agreement is reached
immediately by the majority rule.
The intuition is that, given the set up in the benchmark model, all the other two
politicians are symmetric to the proposer. In this case the proposer will be indifferent
between buying off any of the other two. This induces the possibility of multiple
equilibria. But we focus on the equilibrium in which leadership is going to buy off
his party member. This is because the specified equilibrium is robust if we include
policy into the preference. The idea is that, if the parties also value the policy, then
given the same expected payoff from distributive politics, the proposers will prefer to
buy off the one with the similar policy preference. Therefore the leadership will buy
off party member in this case.
2.5 Results
The main result of the model with information sharing is as follows. There exists
one equilibrium, such that, if the majority party has the proposal power in the first
period, then the majority party leadership is going to buy off the minority party
member. Thereby an agreement is reached immediately by the majority rule. If
delay happens (off equilibrium path), leadership of the majority party will strictly
prefer to include the party member in the winning coalition.
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Two points in this result support the argument of the paper — dynamics and
information sharing hurts party members’ benefits.
The first one is what happens off equilibrium path. Key difference between this
model and the benchmark model is that the information structure of two parties
are not symmetric anymore. This induces that, in any period, from the view of the
proposer, the other two politicians are not symmetric anymore. If no agreement is
reached in the first period, then in the second period, the leadership of the majority
party strictly prefers to buy off his party member. This is because, in the equilibrium
I constructed, the politician in the minority party has a very high expected payoff
on the size of the pie, this will raise the cost of buying off the politician in the
minority party. So the leadership of the majority will strictly prefer to buy off his
party members.
However, the expectation of the politician in minority party will be relative lower
in this case than the benchmark model. This is because, the information sharing
makes the politicians in the majority party know each other’s type, which might
induce a high expectation of the size of the pie, therefore a high reserved value. This
induces a high cost of buying of one of the politicians of the majority party. But the
minority party politician’s expectation on the the size of the pie is still the same as
the benchmark model. Therefore, if the minority party is recognized as the proposer,
he will get a lower expected pay off than the benchmark case.
The second one is the equilibrium proposal in the first period. the majority
leadership will exclude party members from winning coalition, no matter what the
types are. The intuition of this result is as follows. As analyzed before, if delay
happens, the information sharing, on the one hand, will raise the majority party
members’ expectation from delay. On the other hand, this will lower other minority
pary members’ expectation from delay. In this case if the majority leadership has the
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proposal power in the first period, it will be more beneficial for him to sacrifice his
party member by including the politician from the minority party.
The proof of this result is shown to be true by construction. The solution concept
we are using is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and weakly dominance. The construction
follows the logic of backward induction. In next part, we go through the idea of the
main results. The details of the proof are in the appendix.
2.5.1 Analysis in the Second Period
As described in the timing section, in each period, one politician first gives a
proposal, then all three vote to accept and reject on the proposal. Therefore, we
first analyze what happens in the voting process in the second period. We have the
following propositions:
Proposition 11. In t=1, in the sub-game of voting process, for any history
h2 = (h1, pt=1k , p
t=1
l )
where k, l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, j 6= k
h1 = (pt=02 , p
t=0
3 ; At least two choose Rejection)
and for any belief system,
1. Given a type profile (θ1, θ2), it is weakly dominant action for the majority party






















Here, pt=1i is the proposal to politician i in t=1 and
1
3
Ey(y|θ1, θ2, θ3) is the expectation
from no agreement, given a type profile (θ1, θ2, θ3).
The intuition of this result is that, no matter what actions are chosen by each
politicians in the sub-game of voting, we only have two possible results from the
voting — agreement or no agreement. Given this fact, we know that with some
probability there is an agreement, then the politicians from majority party will get
what proposed, say pt=1i , i ∈ {1, 2}. However, with some probability there is no
agreement. If no agreement is reached, and suppose he faces a minority member
with low type, then his expectation from no agreement will be a third of the realized
outcome, give that 3 is low type, which is 1
3
Ey(y|θ1, θ2, θ). If the politician in minority
party is hight type, then his expectation from no agreement will be a third of the
realized come , give that 3 is hight type, which is 1
3
Ey(y|θ1, θ2, θ¯). This induces that,
the expected payoff of the politicians in the majority party is a convex combination




Ey(y|θ1, θ2, θ) and 1
3
Ey(y|θ1, θ2, θ¯)
Therefore, if the politicians in the majority party get a proposal pt=1i which is larger
than the maximal element of the three, he will accept. Meanwhile, if the proposal is
smaller than the minimal element of the three, he will reject.
89
For the politicians in minority party, the intuition is very similar to above argu-
ment. The difference is that, if no agreement is reached, with some probability 3 is
facing two politicians in low types, one in high type one in low type, or both in high
type. This induces that, 3’s expected payoff from the sub-game of voting is a convex




Ey(y|θ, θ, θ3), 1
3
Ey(y|θ, θ¯, θ3) and 1
3
Ey(y|θ1, θ2, θ¯)
Therefore, if the politicians in the majority party get a proposal pt=13 which is larger
than the maximal element of the three, he will accept. Meanwhile, if the proposal is
smaller than the minimal element of the three, he will reject.
Now let us go back to the information set of the proposer in the second period.
Before going to the best response of the proposer, let us first show the following
argument is true.
Lemma 3. In any period, the proposer’s expected payoff is decreasing with the total
proposal given to the other two politicians.
The intuition is that when the total proposal increase, on one hand, the probability
of getting a positive residual will be decreasing; on the other hand, the residual kept
by the proposer will also decrease. Then give the assumption 3 in the set up, the
expected pay off will be decreasing.
Above result can be proved to be true in a more general case. If we relax the
assumption as follows,
When the total proposal is over the budget, the proposer always get a non
positive pay off.
3When the proposal is over the budget, the proposer always gets a zero payoff.
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The intuition is that, when the proposal increase, other than what mentioned above
is true, we also have the following result: the probability of getting a non positive
pay off will be increasing, and because the pay off is non positive, this induce that
the expected pay off will decrease more.
Now let us go to the proposers’ information set in the second period. Because the
random selection rule will give all the politicians a chance to be the proposer in the
second period. We will first go to the case in which the politicians in the majority
have the proposal power, then we will go to the case in which the minority party has
the proposal power.
In the equilibrium we constructed, agreement is reached immediately in the first
period. Therefore all the analysis in the second period is on the off equilibrium path.
Follow the most popular definition of Perfection Bayesian Equilibrium (Furderberg
and Tirole 1991), we could give any belief here. However, we are going to assume
that the beliefs will be the same as the prior, which is 3 only knows
Prob{θ1 = θ¯} = 1
2
and Prob{θ2 = θ¯} = 1
2
1 and 2 knows
Prob{θ3 = θ¯} = 1
2
and all these are assumed to be common knowledge among all the politicians. The
reason here is that, there is no information revealed at the beginning of the second
period. Thus one reasonable belief should be the same as the prior. However, the
main result is robust to the change of this belief. The main result still holds for many
other beliefs. The only difference is the equilibrium proposal given in the second
period.
Proposition 12. In t=1, given that the posterior beliefs are the same as the prior,
and given the subsequent strategies in the voting process, if the majority party has the
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proposal power, then for any history
h1 = (pt=02 , p
t=0
3 ; At least two choose Rejection)










The intuition of this result is simple, but the construction needs some space. So,
we first give the intuition, then give the idea of the proof. All the detail on the
constriction can be find in the appendix. The intuition is as follows. First, given that
the beliefs are the same as the prior, then, for the politician in the minority party,
he is going to take expectation across all the four possible type profiles to get the
expected pay off from no agreement. Second, for the politicians from majority party,
they only need to take expectation on the two possible types of the politician from
the minority party. However, different type profile in the majority party will give
different expectation. For example, if both the politicians in the majority party are
high types, then their expectation on the size of the pie will be relative larger than the
case in which one of the politician in the majority party is low type. Therefore, some
type profiles of the majority party might induce a high expectation then the politician
in minority party. However, for the proposer, his first objective is to maximize his
expected pay off. By majority rule, he only needs to buy off the one who has lower
expected pay off from no agreement. In this result, we can prove that if both the
politicians in the majority are high types, then their expectation on the size of the
pie will be larger than the expectation from minority party. If at least one of the
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politician in the majority party is low type, then their expectation on the size of the
pie will be smaller than the minority party’s expectation on the size of the pie.
However, in this case, the type profiles of the majority party will be perfectly
reviewed. Then the minority party member is not going to take the expectation
across the all the possible type profiles, but realized that both the politicians in the
majority party are high type. This will raise the minority party’ expectation of the
size of the pie, so as the reserved value from delay. Therefore, the leadership of the
majority party will switch to buy off his party member.
Now, we are going to give the idea of the construction which will support above
intuition. First, there might be multiple equilibria in the sub-game of voting. We are
going to apply Proposition 1 to restrict our attention to the non-dominated actions.
Under this restriction, we still might face multiple equilibria. Then we try to focus
on the following equilibria, in which, the equilibria will maximize the expected pay
off of the proposer. To get this job done, we are going to get the maximal value of
proposer’s expected pay off in the sub-game of voting. Then we go back to check if
there is a proposal or proposals to implement this maximal value. If we can find the
proposals to support this maximal value, then the proposal will be one best response
of of the proposer.
To be more specific on above argument, let us consider the following case. We
assume politician 1 is the proposer, he gives proposals to 2 and 3. First, from Propo-
sition 1, we can divide the feasible set of proposals to several different ranges, which
is shown in Figure 2.5.1. In this graph, the horizontal line is the proposals to 2, the
vertical line is the proposals to 3. Let us focus on range X in Figure 2.5.1. From
Proposition 1 we know that, for any proposals in range X, politician 2 is going to
reject no matter what the type profiles are. For politician 3, he is going to accept
any proposals in the range if he is low type; but the action is not determined if 3 is
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hight type. However, as the argument in Proposition 1, we do know that there are
two possible results — agreement is reached or no agreement is reached. If there is
an agreement reached by some proposals in range X, then the proposer’s expected
pay off will be
g(pt=11 + p
t=1
2 |θ1, θ2, θ3)
≡
∫
Pr{pt=12 + pt=13 ≤ y|θ1, θ2, θ3}(y − pt=12 − pt=13 )dF (y|θ1, θ2, θ3)
s.t. (pt=12 , p
t=1
3 ) ∈ X






3Ey(y |θ, θ, θ) 3x2
1
3Ey(y |θ, θ¯, θ¯)
1






In X , 2 rejects ∀(θ1, θ2). 3 accepts if θ3 = θ. Action is not determined for θ3 = θ¯
Figure 2.2:
Then fixed a type profile (θ1, θ2, θ3), we are going to get the maximal among above










Now, we are going to calculate the proposer’s expected pay off in the sub-game of
voting. This will depend on the proposer’s actions in the sub-game of voting. If
the proposer chooses to reject the proposal in range X, then no agreement will be
reached, therefore the proposer’s expected pay off will be,





Here, U1(R|X, h2) denotes politician 1’s expected pay off from choosing to reject the
proposal after history h2. h2 is the history after which all the three politicians vote
on the proposal, which is defined in Proposition 1. If the proposer chooses to accept
the proposal in range X, then the proposer’s expected pay off will be,
U1(A|X, h2) ≤1
2




Here, U1(A|X, h2) denotes politician 1’s expected pay off from choosing to accept
the proposal after history h2. The right hand side of the above expression is one
upper bound of the U1(A|X, h2). Then we do the same analysis across all the ranges
described in Figure 2.5.1. After that, we find one upper bound for all the possible
proposals. To illustrate the point, we show a graph in Figure 2.5.1, which describes
the upper bound of proposer’s expected pay off for all the possible proposals. Here,
the horizontal line is the total proposal given to politicians 2 and 3, the vertical line
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is the upper bound of the proposer’s expected pay off. As shown in Lemma 1, the
proposer’s expected pay off will be decreasing when the total proposal is increasing.
However, after increasing to certain values, the probability of getting an agreement
will be increasing. This will make the proposer’s expected pay off jump to a higher
value, but after that jump, proposer’s expected pay off will decrease again with the
increasing of the proposals. As shown in Figure 2.5.1, if the politicians in the majority
party are both hight type, then the proposer get the maximal expect pay off at the
the proposal k(θ¯). This value is the politician 3’s expected pay off from no agreement.
For all the other type profiles, the proposer reach the maximal expected pay off at
his party member’s expected pay off from no agreement.
Now, we turn to the case in which the politician in minority party is the proposer.
Proposition 13. In t=1, given that the posterior beliefs are the same as the prior,
and given the subsequent strategies in the voting process, if the minority party has the
proposal power, then for any history
h1 = (pt=02 , p
t=0
3 ; At least two choose Rejection)
it is best response for 3 to propose
(pt=11 , p
t=1






If politician 3 has the proposal power, then he will be indifferent between buying
off 1 or 2. The problem here is how much to propose to get an agreement. The trade
off here is that, the politician in minority party could give a low offer to one of the
politicians in the majority party, but he need to take a risk of getting no agreement,
then gets the expected pay off from no agreement. This result shows that, facing this
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Figure 2.4:
trade off, it is best for the proposer to give a relative high proposal, which will be
accepted by the politician in the majority party, no matter what the type profiles are.
The logic of the proof is the same as Proposition 2. We go through all the possible
proposals to find one upper bound of the expected payoff to the proposer, then go
back to check if there is a proposal or proposals to support this upper bound. The
upper bound of the expected pay off for every proposal is shown in Figure 2.5.1. In
this picture, we only show the the case in which the proposer is low type. The case of
high type looks very similar to this picture. Both get the maximal value at w(θ¯, θ¯).
Now we have finished the construction of the equilibrium strategies in the second
period. In the next step, we will go back to the first period. Before that, given the
best response proposed in Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, we are going to calculate
the expected payoff to each legislator. We are going to denote the expected value
from delay as Vi(θ1, θ2), for any θ1, θ2; and V3(θ3), for any θ3.
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For legislator 1, if he is selected to be the proposer, he is going to give an offer
(pt=12 , p
t=1
3 ) = (w(θ1, θ2), 0), to his party member. If the minority party member,





× [Ey,θ3(y|θ1, θ2, θ3)− w(θ1, θ2)]
For the member of the majority party, legislator 2, he has no chance to be the pro-
poser. With probability half, he gets w(θ1, θ2) from politician 1; and with probability




× w(θ1, θ2) + 1
2
× w(θ¯, θ¯)
For legislator 3, if he is selected to be the proposer, then he proposes (pt=11 , p
t=1
2 ) =
(0, w(θ¯, θ¯)). If the leadership of majority party is recognized to be the proposer, then




× [Ey,θ1,θ2(y|θ1, θ2, θ3)− w(θ¯, θ¯)]
By simple algebra and boundary assumption of E(|θ1, θ2, θ3), we get the following
result,
V2(θ¯, θ¯) > V2(θ, θ¯) = V2(θ¯, θ) > V3(θ¯) > V3(θ) > 0
V2(θ¯, θ¯) > V2(θ, θ¯) = V2(θ¯, θ) > V2(θ, θ) > V3(θ) > 0
x
2
> V3(θ¯) > V3(θ)
2.5.2 Analysis in the First Period
In the first period, we are going to assume that all the politicians will take the
value Vi as the expected pay off from no agreement in the first period. This means,
if no agreement is reached in the first period, all the politicians think they will get Vi
from the second period.
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Proposition 14. In t=0, in the sub-game of voting, for any history h0 = (pt=02 , p
t=0
3 )
and any belief system, given the best responses described in Proposition 2 and Propo-
sition 3, and fix the expected payoff from t=1, we have: for a given (θ1, θ2) it is weakly
dominant action for i ∈ {1, 2} to accept any proposal
pt=0i ≥ δVi(θ1, θ2)
And for a given θ3, it is weakly dominant action for 3 to accept any proposal
pt=03 ≥ δV3(θ3)
Here discount factorδ ∈ (0, 1), Vi are the expected payoff from the give best response
described in Proposition 2 and Proposition 3.
The intuition of this proposition is as follows. No matter what actions are chosen
by the politicians in the sub-game of voting, as in the Proposition 1, we only have two
possible results, an agreement is reached or no agreement is reached. For any proposal,
with some probability an agreement is reached, then the politician i gets the proposal,
say pt=0i , where i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. With some probability, no agreement is reached, then the
politician i gets the expected payoff, say Vi, from the second period. However, unlike
the Proposition 1, the Vi is independent of i’s type, therefore, politician i’s expected
payoff in the sub-game of voting in the first period is the convex combination of the
following two elements,
pt=0i and Vi
Thus, if the proposal is larger than the Vi, then politician i will accept it, no matter
what actions is chosen by the other two. Meanwhile, if the proposal is less than Vi,
then politician i will reject it, no matter what actions is chosen by others.
Given the subsequent strategies described above, let us go to the information set
after which politician 1 gives a proposal. The next proposition describes the best
response of politician 1.
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Proposition 15. In t=0, given the prior, and the subsequent strategies in the voting
process and t=1, for any (θ1, θ2), it is best response for the majority party member,
legislator 1, to propose
(pt=02 , p
t=0
3 ) = (0, δV3(θ¯))
This is the proposition supporting the main result of this paper — the information
sharing in a party will hurt the party members. The intuition is that, the information
sharing makes the leadership of the majority party buy off the politicians in the same
party. On the one hand, this will raise the majority party politicians’ expected payoff
from delay. This is supported by the following two reason. First if both the majority
politicians are in high type, then they have a high expectation on the size of the pie.
This will induce a high reserved value. Secondly, the minority party member will give
a hight proposal to buy off the member of the majority party. These two effect will
increase the majority party member’s expected payoff from the second period.
On the other hand, the information sharing will lower the minority party politi-
cian’s expected payoff. This is because, information sharing only increase the the
minority party politician’s cost of buying off one of the majority politicians, but still
keep the same expectation on the size of the pie. This will induce a lower expectation
payoff from the second period. As a result, this gives incentive to the majority party
leadership to buy off the politician who has a lower expected payoff from delay. Given
this fact, the majority party leadership still needs to decide which proposal should
be offered. One trade-off here is that, the leadership of the majority party could give
a lower offer which is just the low type minority party politician’s expected payoff
from delay, say V3(θ). With some probability this will give the majority leaderships
a high residual; but, with some probability, there will be no agreement, therefore no
agreement will be reached, and politician 1 will get the expected payoff from delay,
which is V1(θ1, θ2), for any (θ1, θ2). However, it turns out that this is not the best
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for politician 1. The best response for him is to give a offer which is the high type
minority party politician’s expected payoff from delay. Therefore, no delay happens
under this offer, and it will give the proposer, politician 1, the largest expected payoff,
give the equilibrium strategies constructed in the second period.
The logic of the proof is very similar to the Proposition 2 and 3. We first apply
Proposition 4 to divide the set of feasible proposals to several ranges, then go through
every range to get an upper bound of politician 1’s expected payoff. After that we
go back to find one proposal implement the upper bound. The detail of the proof is
shown in the appendix.
2.6 Conclusion
In this part, let us summarize our main finding and point out some extendable
assumptions. The main point of this paper — party might hurt its member’s benefit—
hinges on the following arguments.
Information sharing makes the politicians in the same party know each other
better than the politicians from other parties. This might induce a low expectation
on the size of the budget to the party members. However, after considering the
random selection rule of the proposer, the member might have a higher expected
payoff than the politician in the other party. In a dynamic environment, when the
majority leadership wants to get an agreement immediately, he needs to choose the
politician with low expected payoff from future. This would be the politician from
the other party.
Some of our modeling assumptions deserve further discussions. First, we assume
that the party only help members to share information in the legislation. However,
sometimes, parties also help members to coordinate actions in the legislation. For
example, the whips in the U.S political system also try to coordinate members’ actions
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in the legislation. It would be interesting to investigate how this function of party
will affect party members’ benefits. A reasonable conjecture is that, the coordination
might give some benefits to the party members. To support this result, there might
be some inside transfers or some party doctrine to force the leadership to fulfill this
job. However this does not necessary contradict the results in my model. Because
the leaderships’ benefit still might be hurt in this case.
Second, in this model, the leadership of the majority is predetermined to be politi-
cian 1 and fixed across the whole game. But this is not true in general, in almost
all the democratic parties, the leaderships is not predetermined. The leaderships also
try to hold the office, this gives them incentives to benefit their members so as to get
supports in the re-election. If we consider this fact, some of the results in this model
might change. One reasonable conjecture is that, in order to maintain the reputation
so as to get re-elected. The leaderships might sacrifice his own benefits to include his




ON BOARD AS A MEDIUM OF INFORMATION TRANSMITTER
3.1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom describes boards as ineffective rubber-stamper controlled by
management. The typical complaints about the indolent behavior of boards might
date back to Mace (1971). Recent research, most empirically, argue that the board
of directors performs the critical function on firm performance. And empirically it is
true that if the board of directors could perform in a great level of independence on
effective monitoring, the firms’ performance would be improved, see Weisbach (1988),
Brickley et al. (1994), just name a few here.
In the theoretical study on the interactions between the boards and the man-
agement, most researches focus on questions, such as why boards may not monitor
too intensively, see Warther (1998), Almazan and Suarez (2003), Adams and Ferreira
(2007); and they argue that the passive (or weak) boards may be optimal in the view
of shareholders. Only a few researches try to consider the possible collusion between
the board and the management, see Bourjade and Germain (2012). Li and Zhenhua
(2013) studies the information sharing and the collusion between the directors and
management.
However, one common assumption in most of these researches 1 , theoretical
or empirical, is that, in the monitoring process, the board of directors always per-
fectly represent the shareholders to maximize the welfare of them. But in the real
1Li and Zhenhua (2013) divides the shareholders to different interest groups and study the col-
lusion between the management and the directors who represents shareholders in different interests.
They open a quite new channel to study the collusion between the boards directors and the man-
agement.
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interactions between the board directors and management, they are more privately
connected. The personal relationship might be beyond the control of the shareholders.
Meanwhile, the dual board system 2 also pushes the board of directors to collude
with the management. So one conjecture is that there might be underground deals
between the directors and the management. It also has been argued that the lack of
shareholder power gives rise to situations in which the management and the board of
directors might mutually protect each other, see Beetsma et al. (2000). Most recent
corporate scandals in the US and Europe have also emphasized the collusion between
the board of directors and the management. For instance, as reported by the New
York Times (Jan 2013), in Walmart Bribery scandal, the directors collude with the
management to bribe Mexican officials and share part of the additional benefits. 3
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to theoretically study how the interactions
between the board directors and the management would affect the firm performance
and the relation (contract) between the shareholder and the management. Our model
has four key features. First, board of directors do not perfectly aligned with share-
holders, and the management has private information on his “type”, e.g., ability,
marginal cost. This ability is not observed by the shareholders. Second, the board
is working as a medium to monitor and transfer the management’s information to
the shareholder. In the monitoring process, the board can only observe an imperfect
(noisy) signal about the management’s “type”. Third, there is a market of director-
ships to evaluate directors’ actions in the monitoring. Fourth, the interaction between
the directors and the management are explicitly modeled as a bargaining process.
2In this system, the board of directors are separated from the management. This is very common
in the organization of modern firms.
3Newspapers also document many other evidences. For instance, in Netherland, there is a case
of Vie d’Or in which the directors and managements were involved jointly in outright fraud, see
Beetsma et al. (2000). It is obvious that only the cases end badly would get attention from the
media.
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The first feature is motivated by the facts that the directors might be more pri-
vately connected to the management. It is also supported by the fact that the directors
might represent shareholders in different interests. For example, among outside direc-
tors, they represent shareholders, debt-holders, and other stakeholders in different in-
terests, (e.g., Byrd and Mizruchi (2005) on bankers on the board; Baker and Gompers
(2003) on Venture capitalists; Faleye et al. (2006) on employees). This induce that the
directors may not be perfectly aligned with the majority of shareholders. Meanwhile,
the CEO’s ability may not be observed by the shareholders, (e.g., Milbourn (2003)).
This feature has been supported by evidences, such as the Sabarnes-Oxley Act, the
NYSE and the NASDAQ regulations in the US request that the board directors need
to supervise the firms’ management. The scandals of Enron, Worldcom and others
also tell us that the accountants who are supposed to help reveal information may
actually help the management conceal the truth. These actions might induce more
transaction cost in the monitoring process and make it much harder for the board
to see the real face of the management. The third feature could go back to Fama
and Jensen (1983), who notices that the important incentives for directors to monitor
comes from the reputation effect in market of directorships. This argument is also
supported by empirical research on the reputation effects in the market for direc-
torships, e.g., Yermack (2004) and Fich and Shivdasani (2007). Recently, Knyazeva
et al. (2013) studies the relationship between board structures and the market of
directorships. They empirically suggest that firm’s performance, board independence
are significantly related to market of directorships; and the shareholders’ welfare is
related to directors’ reputation. But they did not explain the intrinsic mechanism.
To this end, we try to formalize this point and discuss this mechanism. For the fourth
point, we believe that the bargaining is the most popular communication channel in
business interactions, see Raiffa (1982).
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In our setting, we focus on the function of monitoring of the boards directors, so
the final production would only be affected by the ability of the management. The
ability is assumed to be private information which is not observed by the shareholder.
In this case, from the classical principal-agent model, we know that in order to max-
imize the welfare of the shareholders, they need to pay additional information rent
to the management who tries to mimic, see Laffont and Martimort (2009). For the
shareholders, in order to lower the information rent and also monitor the true abil-
ity of the management, we introduce the board of directors who might observe the
true ability of the management. We also assume that there is a market of director-
ships. This market would respond to the board directors’ action in the monitoring
process. The directors care the evaluation (their reputation)from the market. An
honest reporting of signals on the management’s ability would always induce a po-
tential positive benefit from this market. However, any dishonest behaviors would
induce a potential loss from this market.
In the monitoring process, we assume that the type of the management may not be
perfectly observed by the directors, they can only observe a noisy signal related to the
true ability of the management. Meanwhile, the directors could privately communi-
cate with the management to make a deal and conceal the signal on the management’s
true ability. We explicitly model the communication process as an infinitely alterna-
tive bargaining between the directors and the management. In practice, this collusion
may result a decreased level of production and an increased level of transaction cost
between the shareholders and the management. However, we argue that, a proper
designed institution (board structure) and incentive to the directors might block the
collusion. Thus it would also improve the shareholders’ benefit.
To our knowledge, our paper is the first theoretical study on the collusion be-
tween the board and the management by explicitly modeling the interaction between
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the management and the board of directors as a bargaining process. Collusion has
been studied in the mechanism design literature. The seminal paper of Tirole (1986)
studies a three level organization with a principal, a supervisor and an agent in the
setting with moral hazard. However, in this literature, the interaction between the
supervisor and the agent are essentially a black box. They notice that there is a
underground bargaining between the supervisor and the agent, but they assume that
the outcome of the bargaining always reach the Pareto efficient allocation. In general
this is not true. The equilibrium outcomes of the bargaining could depend on many
features of the bargaining, such as the players’ risk attitudes, their outside options
and information structure, see Muthoo (1999) and Ausubel et al. (2002). Meanwhile,
from the existing research, both empirical and theoretical, we already notice that the
boards directors do care their reputation from the market of directorships, see Adams
et al. (2008) for the survey on this topic. Therefore, this paper tries to open the black
box by considering the reputation effects in the market of directorships and also the
bargaining between the boards directors and the management.
This framework allows us to derive many results and implications which may not
be delivered by current researches. More precisely, our results are the following. First,
after introducing a board of directors who do not communicate with the management,
we show that, whether the boards’ influence is positive or negative depends on the
accuracy of the signal and whether the signal infers the management is efficient, i.e.,
the acctual signal observed by the board. Here, the signal is explained as the indicator
of the management’s “type”. Given that the board could observe the management’s
true “type” with high probability, and the board reports that a non-efficient man-
agement is observed, then the shareholders’ posterior on the management being an
efficient type would be decreased. This would reduce the shareholders’ fear of giving
up an information rent, but increase the production level of the non-efficient man-
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agement. In other words, the board’s would improve the firm’s performance, so as
the welfare of the shareholders, in the sense that a high lever of outcome would be
produced, and a low expectation of giving up information rent. But we would never
hope the board helps the shareholders to reach the first best in which there is no
asymmetric information between the shareholder and the management. The same
argument would apply for the case with low accuracy signal plus a report of facing an
efficient management. However, if the board could accurately observe the true signal
of the management, and he actually observes that the management is an efficient
type, then it would increase the shareholders’ fear of giving up the information rent.
Meanwhile, a low lever of outcome would be produced. This induce that, the presence
of the board would actually worse the performance of the firm, so as the welfare of
the shareholders.
Second, if we allow communication between the board and the management, then
the optimal compensation to block the collusion between the board and the man-
agement would decrease the production level and the information rent payed to the
management would also be decreased.
Third, after introducing a market which could evaluate the board directors’ rep-
utation, and a bargaining between the boards and the management, we find that:
If the market is sensitive to board of director’s reports (more dependent directors),
a high rewards to the truth reporting or a serious punishment to the fake reporting
from the market may not really encourage the board to report truth. This is because,
high rewards or serious punishment from the market of directorships only gives the
board more bargain chips to raise his share of the information rent from the manage-
ment. Meanwhile this would increase the shareholders’ cost of blocking the collusion
between the board and the management. Furthermore, as before, this would lower
the production level.
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However, if the market of directorships does not sensitively respond to board’s
actions (more independent directors), the shareholder would pay less to block the
collusion, and the level of production would increase. This is because, a non-sensitive
market would lower the board’s bargain chips, therefore lower his share of the in-
formation rent from the management. Then, from the view of shareholders, this
board structure would lower the shareholder’s cost of blocking the collusion. Fur-
thermore, this would increase the production level. Meanwhile, from the view of the
management, he would also prefer a more independent board. This is because more
information rent could be kept by the management, if the board is structured with
more independent directors.
These results theoretically confirm the empirical argument that firm’s performance
might be better with more independent directors in the board, see Adams et al. (2008)
for a survey on the empirical results. Two other theoretical paper also deliver the
similar message as our model here, see Adams and Ferreira (2007), Bourjade and
Germain (2012). However, the intrinsic mechanism driving our result is quite different
from theirs.
If we only focus on the interactions between the board and the mangement, above
resluts also tell us why the management prefers a more independent board than a
less independent one. This is because, the management could keep more information
rent from the more independent board.
Fourth, if the size of board is large, it might be more expensive for the manage-
ment to make all the board directors conceal his private information. Knowing this
potential deal between the directors and the management, the shareholders could
properly design a compensation rule to block the deal by increasing the transaction
cost between them. We expect, therefore, that a proper designed compensation rule
plus a proper market institution would lower the transaction cost between the share-
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holder and management. Thus also improve the performance of the firm and the
welfare of the shareholder. However, if the size of the board is not large enough to
block the collusion, then the large the size of the board, the higher the cost for the
shareholders to block the collusion.
More interestingly, we also find that, if each directors’ compensation from the
market of directorships depends on the per capita contribution to the firm’s perfor-
mance, i.e., link the evluation from the market of directorships to the size of the
board, then the rent to block the collusion would be independent from the size of the
board. This result is not addressed in the literature about optimal boar size, such as
Raheja (2005) and Coles et al. (2008).
Another implication of our theoretical prediction is that: The payment to the
CEO would be affected by board independence. The more independent of the board,
the less might be payed to the CEO. This result is in contrary to the empirical
findings which argues that total CEO pay is not affected by board independence, see,
Knyazeva et al. (2013).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 sets
up the benchmark without the board of directors. In section 4, we introduce the
board as a medium to transfer manager’s information to the shareholders. In section
5, we analyze the equilibrium result of the bargaining between the board and the
management. In section 6, we discuss the reputation effects of market of directorships
on the boards’ supervision. In section 7, we extend the model to discuss the board size
and the supervision of the board. Last two sections highlight the policy implications
of our analysis and concludes. We present proofs in the Appendix.
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3.2 Model
Let us consider an environment with three players which are called shareholder,
management and board of directors 4 . The shareholders authorizes the management
to operate a firm. The production is affected by the “type” of the management which
is measure by the marginal cost of the management, S. The marginal cost of the
management is not observed by the shareholders which can take one of two values
{θg, θb} with respective probabilities pi ∈ (0, 1) and 1 − pi. We let ∆θ = θb − θg > 0.
This probability is common knowledge, but only the management knows the true
value of θ.
The “type” here could be explained in many different ways. One popular explana-
tion is ability. managements with high ability are more easily to catch the prospective
market. This would save lots of cost for the firm. However, the low ability ones may
spends lots of budget to explore the market. Another explanation is personal net-
work. managements with strong network are more easily to extend the market of the
firm; however, the ones with weak network may need lots of resource to extend the
market.
3.2.1 Technology of Supervision
The main questions in this paper is to study how to give incentives to the board
to make them truthfully report the signal, and how to prevent the possible collu-
sion between the board directors and the management. So we are going to assume
that the board always chooses to monitor the management and gets information on
management’s type.
4In this paper, we do not model the difference between outside director and inside directors. In
reality, directors in these two groups would behave quite differently. In a companion paper, we try
to study the boardroom collusion with heterogeneous directors, see Wu (2013a) .
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Let us consider an environment in which the directors receives a signal s ∈ {g, b}
about the true type, S ∈ {θg, θb}, of the management. We assume that the signal is
imperfect but informative and distributed according to
Prob(g|θg) = Prob(b|θb) = µ ∈ (0, 1)
This reads as: With a positive probability µ 5 , the director would observe a signal
which truthfully indicates the real type of the management, i.e., observe s when the
true state is S = θs. We assume that shareholders place prior probability pi ∈ (0, 1)
on the management’s type being efficient, θg. After seeing the signal, we assume that
the directors would truthfully report the signal they have got.
Here, we assume that the information observed by the board is “hard” or verifiable
in the sense that: When the board observes the state of manager’s type (marginal
cost), the board can convey this information to the shareholders in a credible way in
which, the shareholders can look at the evidence and be convinced that the board
has announce the true state of the marginal cost. However, the board could lie
and announce nothing or announce that they observed the other type. In reality,
the board usually presents the evidence from auditor or other source to show the
manager’s ability or effort in the management. The evidence is verifiable but could
be concealed or affect by the board. A board could affect the evidence through the
choice of auditor, the oversight over reporting requirements, and the control over
accounting practices.
Remark In general, when the directors give a report, sˆ ∈ {gˆ, bˆ}, to the shareholders,
the directors are free to report either bˆ or gˆ, and we write the directors’ strategy
5The value of µ could be endogenized as a function of the board’s efforts in monitoring, the
transaction cost in board decision, the size of the board, or any other characters of the boards. We
denote these characters as x. If x is explained as the effort putting in monitoring, then µ(x) would
be increasing with the effort. This means that a high level effort leads to a high level monitoring.
This further induce a high level of probability of getting the real type of the management.
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conditional on its signal by σs(sˆ) = Pr(sˆ|s) ∈ [0, 1]. Without loss of generality, we
will restrict attention to strategies with σb(bˆ) ≥ σg(bˆ) and σg(gˆ) ≥ σb(gˆ). However,
this strategic reporting would not affect the main results of the paper. So we simply
assume that the directors would truthfully report the signal to the shareholders.
3.2.2 Technology
There is a technology which is denoted by
y =

q1 if θ = θg
q2 if θ = θb
In this paper, we want to focus on the monitoring from the board, not the provision
of advice, so in this technology, only the management’s type affects the outcome.
In this paper we are going to consider two different board institutions. In the first
institution, there is no communication between the board and the management, i.e.,
there is no chance for the board to make deal with the management. In the second
institution, the board could communicate with the management and make a deal on
the share of the information rent. But in both institutions, the board will transfer
the information on management’s type to shareholders. Only difference is whether
board would collude with management.
3.2.3 Market of Directorships
After the report of the management’s type, we assume that there is a market
which can evaluate the precision of the report. The board could get utility from
this evaluation which is denoted by k(ε, η, y) ∈ R. This utility is determined by the
precision of the report, which is measured by ε ∈ {0, 1}, the board’s relation to this
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market which is measured by η ∈ [0, 1] 6 and the outcome from the technology which
is described by y. We assume k(ε, η, y) is differentiable with respect to η and y, such
that 7
ky(ε, η, y) ≥ 0 and kη(ε, η, y) ≥ 0
We further assume that with probability ρ ∈ (0, 1), the true state θ will be perfectly
revealed. This also induce that with probability ρ the market and the shareholders
can tell if the board tells the truth. If θˆ = θ, the board gets k(ε = 1, η, y) from the
market; otherwise, the board gets k(ε = 0, η, y) such that,
k(ε = 1, η, y) > k(ε = 0, η, y) ≥ 0 ∀η, y
Here k(ε = 1, η, y) could be explained as the ego rent to the board directors. Or just
think about it as a reward from the market for the precise report. k(ε = 0, η, y) is
the punishment 8 of concealing information. We can think about k(ε = 0, η, y) as a
present discount value from the market. The story behind this could be explained as
follows, if the market knows that the board director is bribing with the management,
then the director would not get any benefit from the market. For instance, if the board
directors are CEO from other firms, and they are revealed to concealing information
or bribing, the scandal might affect their normal income, their firm’s stock price and
so on, see Fich and Shivdasani (2007) on a study about the relationship between the
financial fraud and directors’ compensation from the market of directorships.
The key point we need is that the directors’ benefit from market of directorships
is increasing with the firm’s performance and the directors’ actions in the monitoring
6The explanation of ε here shares the same feature as the µ in Raheja (2005) which is a measure
of sensitivity of directors’ payoffs to firm value.
7Here, we use the subscript to indicate the differentiation on the subscripted element.
8In reality the punishment could a negative value, for instance, in the scandals of Enron and
Worldcom, the directors of each board had to pay investor plaintiffs, which are out of their pocket.
Our results will not change if we allow this value to be negative. The key point here is that the
market compensation to the honest behaviors is always higher than the one to dishonest behaviors.
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process. In order to simplify analysis, we assume the market evaluation has the
following form,
k(ε, η, y) ≡ k(ε, η)y
where k(ε, η) > 0 is continuous with respect to µ ∈ [0, 1], ∀ε. We also assume that,
limη→1k(ε = 1, η, y) = k¯ > 0 ∀η, y
limη→1k(ε = 0, η, y) = 0 ∀η, y
and
limη→0k(ε, η, y) = 0 ∀ε, η, y
Here, ε = 1 means perfectly revealing of the true state (the type of the management),
i.e., the board tells the truth, otherwise no information on the state is revealed.
η → 0 means that the boards directors does not value the response from market of
directorships. Then the value from the market does not matter to the directors. One
explanation is that, the board directors might be from a non-finance market. For
instance, board directors could be a professor of college, and the value of precision on
his report in the market does not affect what he earns from the college or academia.
However, when η → 1, which means that the director is perfectly related to the
finance market. Then the market value would matter to the boards directors. The
precision of the report and firm’s performance would affect the directors’ utility a lot.
For example, the CEO of Google, Eric Schmidt, used to be a board member of Apple,
in this case, Google CEO’s any action as a board member of Apple might affect his
benefit from Google’s shareholders. Any negative information about his action in
Apple’s board monitoring could lower his benefit from the market of directorships.
Meanwhile, any positive information about his actions as a director could increase
his value from the market of directorship. Meanwhile, the high level production or
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performance also could induce a high level payment to the board. This could be cash
reward or compensations in other form.
If the true state is not revealed, then the board gets r ≥ 0, to simplify analysis,
we normalize r = 0. The main results of this paper would not change, if we allow
r > 0
To simplify analysis, and guarantee that the board always tells the truth when no
deal is made between him and the management, we further assume that,
ρk(ε = 1, η, y) ≥ c
This means that the expected payoff of truth telling from the market is larger than
the cost of monitoring the management 9 . This induces that, the board always has
incentive to monitor the management. Then the only problem for the shareholders
is how to give incentives to the board to make them report the true information and
not to collude with the management.
3.2.4 The Bargaining Between the Board and the Management
In this section, we would explicitly model the communication between the board
and management. We assume that they sign a contract to deliver α ∈ [0, 1] share of
the information rent, Q > 0, to the board. In this subsection, we would model the
communication between the two as a bargaining process. The side contract 10 be-
tween the management and the board is explained as an agreement in the bargaining.
To make it more clear, we formally describe the bargaining process in this section.
9The goal of the paper is to study how to give incentives to the board to report the truth and
how to lower the chance of collusion between the board and the management. So we will simplify
the board’s decision on whether to monitor the management.
10We do not give any restriction on the form of the contract. In many situations, the contract may
not be a formal contract which could be justified by the court. It could be any kind of agreement
between the board of director and the management with an asset could be measure by dollar amount.
It could be liquid asset, such as cash or other asset, such as a jet plane.
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The board and the management bargain over the partition of the potential rent
according to an alternating offer procedure. One of the player i ∈ {S,A}, where
S indicates board and A indicates the management, would have chance to give the
first proposal xi > 0. It is the amount kept by player i. After seeing the offer, the
responder has three choices, say: i) accept the offer, ii) reject the offer and make a
counter offer x−i, and iii) reject the offer and quit the bargaining, in which case the
true state would be reported to the shareholders. In case i), the bargaining would
end with the given the proposal. In case ii), player −i would given another offer and
player i would respond the same choice as player −i. This bargaining keeps going
until an agreement is reached, or one of them want to quit the bargaining.
The payoffs are as follows. If the board and the management reaches agreement
at time t, where t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , on a partition that gives player i ∈ {S,A} xi(t),
0 ≤ xi(t) < Q, then his payoff would be
xi(t)e
−γit
To save some space for notation, we define δi ≡ e−γi . If no agreement is reached at
t, and the responder chooses to quit, then the players would take up their outside
option. For the board, he would report the management’s type truthfully, and get
the expected value from the market
δtSwS where wS = ρk(ε = 1, η, y)
For the management, he would get no information rent.We denote it as wA = 0. If
the board and the management can not reach an agreement perpetually, then each
of them gets zero 11 .
11Think about this payoff as the case in which the discount factor converge to zero, the rent to
be divided would be vanished.
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Remark Here, δi could be explained as the discount factor in the normal sense.
We can also explain it as the measure of risk aversion. Under this explanation, δi
is a function of the risk aversion index ri. Therefore, large δi indicates low level of
risk aversion, and small δi indicates high level of risk aversion. Because the board
and the management signs the contract underground and both are afraid to be found;
therefore, if the agreement is not reached, the risk of getting exposed would be higher.
Thus their value from future would be discounted.
3.2.5 Preference
The role of shareholders here is to maximize his own utility
V = v(q)− ta − ts
by choosing a compensation rule ta > 0 to the management and ts > 0 to the board.
We assume v′ > 0, v′′ < 0. The management’s preference is
U = ta − θq
For the board, if there is no communication between the board and the management,
then he is going to maximize the expected value from the market. Otherwise, he is
going to maximize the expected payoff from the market and the collusion from the
management.
If the management or the board do not participate the game described above,
then both of them get zero utility from outside. Therefore the production can not
happen, then the shareholders also get zero.
119
3.3 Benchmark
3.3.1 Complete Information Without Board
Under complete information about the management’s type θ, the shareholders
would equal the marginal utility of the production to the marginal cost, i.e.,
v′(q∗1) = θg and v
′(q∗2) = θb (3.1)
and would give no rent to management, so that
t∗1 = θgq
∗
1 and t2 = θbq
∗
2 (3.2)
3.3.2 Asymmetric Information Without Board
In this benchmark, we only consider the interaction between the shareholders
and the management. And the board is omitted from the model. In order to make
the management participate the production, the benefit from the participating the
production should be no less than the value form not participating, i.e., for all θ
U = ta − θq ≥ 0 (3.3)
Given above constraint, the task of the shareholders is to specify the appropriate
compensation rule to the management in order to maximize expected utility from
production. From revelation principle, we know that this can be obtained from the
optimal revelation mechanism, which is a pair of compensation rule (q1, t1), (q2, t2)
and satisfy the following incentive compatible conditions.
t1 − θgq1 ≥ t2 − θgq2 (3.4)
t2 − θbq2 ≥ t1 − θbq1 (3.5)
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Under these conditions, the optimal compensation rule can be characterized by the
following condition,
v′(q∗1) = θg (3.6)
v′(q∗2) = θb +
pi
1− pi∆θ (3.7)
3.4 Asymmetric Information with Board
3.4.1 Inferring Type from Board
As a first step to analyzing the game, we consider how the shareholders’ posterior
belief on manager’s type depends on the board’s reports, the accuracy of the signal,
µ, and the shareholders’ prior, pi.
Given above set up, we are going to determine the shareholders’ posterior on the
management’s type of being efficient, θg, after seeing a report sˆ = gˆ, i.e.,
Pr(S = θg|sˆ = gˆ) = Pr(sˆ = gˆ|S = θg)× Pr(S = θg)
Pr(sˆ = gˆ|S = θg)× Pr(S = θg) + Pr(sˆ = gˆ|S = θb)× Pr(S = θb)
On the one hand, we know that with probability pi the true type of the management
is θg, i.e., Pr(S = θg) = pi. However, the directors may not perfectly observe this.
With probability µ directors observes g, and they report gˆ with probability σg(gˆ), the
mixed strategy of reporting gˆ after seeing g. Meanwhile, with probability 1− µ, the
directors would also report gˆ with probability σb(gˆ) , even if they observe a signal b.
On the other hand, we know that with probability 1 − pi the true type of the
management is θb, i.e., Pr(S = θb) = 1− pi. In this case, after seeing a report sˆ = gˆ,
the shareholders know the follows is happening. With probability 1 − µ directors
observe a signal g and report gˆ with probability σg(gˆ). Meanwhile, with probability
µ directors observes a signal b but they choose to report as gˆ with probability σb(gˆ).
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Therefore, we have the following result,
Pr(S = θg|sˆ = gˆ) = pi[σg(gˆ)× µ+ σb(gˆ)× (1− µ)]
pi[σg(gˆ)× µ+ σb(gˆ)× (1− µ)] + (1− pi)[σg(gˆ)× (1− µ) + σb(gˆ)× µ]
Similarly, we can determine the shareholders’ posterior belief on the management’s
type of being efficient, θg, after seeing a report sˆ = bˆ:
Pr(S = θg|sˆ = bˆ) = Pr(sˆ = bˆ|S = θg)× Pr(S = θg)
Pr(sˆ = bˆ|S = θg)× Pr(S = θg) + Pr(sˆ = gˆ|S = θb)× Pr(S = θb)
=
pi[σg(bˆ)× µ+ σb(bˆ)× (1− µ)]
pi[σg(bˆ)× µ+ σb(bˆ)× (1− µ)] + (1− pi)[σg(bˆ)× (1− µ) + σb(bˆ)× µ]
If the directors always truthfully report the signal, i.e.,
σs(sˆ) = Pr(sˆ|s) = 1 and σs′(sˆ) = Pr(sˆ|s′) = 0
where, s′ 6= s, then we put them into Pr(S = θg|sˆ = gˆ) and Pr(S = θg|sˆ = bˆ) defined
above. We have the following expression,
Pr(S = θg|sˆ = gˆ) = piµ
piµ+ (1− pi)(1− µ)
and
Pr(S = θg|sˆ = bˆ) = pi(1− µ)
pi(1− µ) + (1− pi)µ
From these expressions, we can immediately have the following statement:
Lemma 4. Suppose that the board truthfully reports the signal with positive probabil-
ity, then the posterior belief of the management being an efficient type would depend
on the report from the board.
• If the board reports that the management is efficient type, i.e., sˆ = gˆ, then the
posterior belief of the management’s type, Pr(S = θg|sˆ = gˆ), is increasing with
the prior, pi, and the accuracy of the signal, µ.
122
• If the board reports that the management is non-efficient type, i.e., sˆ = bˆ, then
the posterior belief of the management’s type, Pr(S = θg|sˆ = bˆ), is increasing
with the prior, pi, but is decreasing with the accuracy of the signal, µ.
These results are very intuitive. They tell us that the more the shareholders’ prior
beliefs favor the efficient type, θg, the more likely the shareholders will believe that the
management is efficient, no matter what report they get from the board. Meanwhile,
the more accurate the signal of being an efficient management is received by the
board, i.e., µ is large, the more likely the shareholders believe that the management
is efficient if a message of being efficient is reported. However, if a message of being
non-efficient is reported, and given that a high accuracy of a non-efficient signal might
be received by the board, then it would be less likely for the shareholders to believe
that the management is efficient.
Meanwhile, it is easy to check that, in general
Pr(S = θg|sˆ = gˆ) 6= Pr(S = θg|sˆ = bˆ)
unless we have µ = 1
2
. This tells us: In general, the shareholders would have different
posterior on the management’s type after seeing different reports from the board.
3.4.2 No Communication Between the Board and the Management
In this section, we first consider a board institution in which the board direc-
tors or board could not communicate with the management. And the technology of
supervision is explained as above.
Proposition 16. Given that there is no communication between the board and the
management, if the following conditions are true:
µ ∈ (1
2
, 1) and sˆ = bˆ is reported.
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or
µ ∈ (0, 1
2
) and sˆ = gˆ is reported.
then the presence of the board would improve shareholders’ benefit, in the sense that,
• The chance of giving up an information rent is lower than the case of no board
monitoring;
• The production of the non-efficient type would be higher than the case of no
board monitoring.
Let us see why it is true. Given that the board can not communicate with the man-
agement, the directors would not share any information rent with the management.
Then given the posterior belief, the shareholders choose the contract to maximize the
expected utility. The optimal contract needs to satisfy the following condition,
v′(qˆ0∗1 ) = θg
v′(qˆ0∗2 ) = θb +
pˆi(sˆ)
1− pˆi(sˆ)∆θ




. By manipulating algebras, we get:
pˆi(gˆ) < pi, if µ ∈ (0, 1
2
); and pˆi(bˆ) < pi, if µ ∈ (1
2
, 1).
We can also check that if these conditions are not satisfied, then the posterior
of the management being efficient would be higher than the prior. This means the
chance of giving up an information rent would be higher. From above optimization
conditions, we know that the non-efficient type management would induce a lower
level production. All these would worsen the shareholder’s benefit. The key point
here is that, after getting the null report from the board, the shareholders knows that
he is facing a high ability management with a lower probability pˆi. Accordingly, the
information rent give to the low ability management will also be lower.
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3.4.3 A Simplified Supervision Technology
From now on, we are going to focus on the cases in which the board would improve
the efficiency when there is no collusion between the board and the management.
Therefore, we can study how the collusion between the board and the management
would distort the equilibrium outcomes. In order to fulfill this job in a simple way,
we introduce the following simplified supervision technology.
We assume that the board’s monitoring can only inform about the efficient type
θg. That is, if θ = θg, then with probability µ ∈ (0, 1), the board perfectly observes
the efficient type, i.e.,
Prob(g|θg) = µ
and with probability 1− µ, he observes nothing, i.e., if S = θb, then sˆ = 0. It is easy
to check this supervision technology is a special case of the one defined above. The
detail is in the Appendix.
Give this simplified supervision technology, if the shareholders report nothing,
then the shareholders revises his belief based on the Bayesian rule. The posterior of
the hight ability is
Prob{θ = θg|sˆ = 0}
=
Prob{θg} × Prob{sˆ = 0|θg}
Prob{θb} × Prob{sˆ = 0|θb}+ Prob{θg} × Prob{sˆ = 0|θ1}
=
(1− µ)pi
(1− µ)pi + (1− pi) =
(1− µ)pi
1− µpi ≡ pˆi
It is easy to check that pˆi < pi.
Given this belief, the shareholders choose the contract to maximize the expected
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utility. Then the optimal contract needs to satisfy the following condition,
v′(qˆ0∗1 ) = θ1
v′(qˆ0∗2 ) = θ2 +
(1− µ)pi
1− pi ∆θ
One immediate implication from above result is that,
Proposition 17. 1. Strong level of monitoring by the board would give a more
accurate information about the type of the management. This means that, if
a signal of efficient type is reported, then it is sure that the management is
efficient. Furthermore, no information rent would be payed to the management.
2. Low level of monitoring by the board would give no information to the share-
holders, then no type is revealed, thus the shareholders still need to pay the
information rent to the management.
The proof of this proposition is simple. For the first part, since we explain the
probability µ as a function of the board’s effort. High level of monitoring could
induces a high probability of a signal which indicates the efficient management, i.e.,
µ would converge to probability 1, For the second part, it is easy to show that when
the board lower the effort in the monitoring, the probability µ would converge to
probability 0. Then the would be the same as the case of no board.
The intuition is as follows: With a high level of monitoring, an efficient type man-
agement would more easily be revealed to the board. Then a piece of more accurate
information is reported to the shareholders. After perfectly revealing the informa-
tion on the management, the contract between the shareholders and the management
would be the same as the case of complete information. Therefore, there would be
no information rent payed to the management, the production level of non-efficient
management would increase. However, with a low level of monitoring, the board
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may get nothing. Then the situation would be the same as the case of incomplete
information with no board, i.e., the board would be useless.
3.4.4 Communication Between the Board and the Management
In the previous analysis, the board and the management has no way to commu-
nicate and no deal would be made between them.
However, in practice, and also as criticized by corporate finance literature, the
board members may belong to the same social network as the management. In this
case, the board members and the management might sign a side contract, or get a
underground deal to share the information rent.
If the board could communicate and make deal with the management, then after
seeing a signal which indicate a efficient management, the board has incentive to
conceal his signal and share the information rent ∆θqˆ2 with the management. Mean-
while, a rational board would also consider the potential loss from the labor market
if he misreports the signal. Then without considering the detail of the agreement be-
tween the board and the management, we know that, the maximum amount of money
the board could get from the management is ∆θqˆ2, however, the board would face
a potential loss of ρk(ε = 0, η, y) in this case. Then the board’s maximum expected
benefit from collusion would be
∆θqˆ2 + ρk(ε = 0, η, y)
Then we have the following result:
Proposition 18. If there is communication between the board and the management,
then
1. There exist an optimal compensation to the board which would block the collusion
between the board and the management.
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2. The optimal production level of the efficient management would be decreased.
3. The expected information rent to the management would be decreased.
Proof. We first assume that in the communication between the board and the man-
agement, they have an agreement, a contract, on the division of the rent. In this
agreement, the board would get share α ∈ [0, 1] of the rent and the management
keeps 1 − α of the rent. This also includes the case of no side contract between the
management and board. It is capture by α = 0.
The detail of the communication would be modeled later. And we are going to
prove that there is a unique equilibrium which would support the share α. But for
now we assume that in equilibrium the board would get α from the management.
In general, there might be multiple equilibrium in the communication between the
board and management. But no matter what agreement is reached between them,
we can always rewrite the rent delivered to the board as α∆θqˆ2. Here qˆi, i = 1, 2, is
the outcome of production if a θi management and the board are presented.
Therefore, in order to block the possible agreement between the management and
the board, the shareholders only needs to provide the same amount to the board,
then it would be weakly dominate strategy for the board to reject the offer from
the management, but to accept the offer from the shareholders and truthfully report
the management’s type to the shareholders. And this would be happening with
probability piµ. This is explained as follows. First, with probability pi the board
would meet a θg type management, and this would give the board a chance to conceal
the signal. However, it is not certain for the board to observe the signal of type, he
can only observe θg with probability µ, given that the true state is θg.
If the board reports that the management is efficient, then the shareholders only




happens with probability piµ + (1 − pi)(1 − µ), i.e., with probability piµ, an efficient
management is observed to be efficient. Meanwhile, with probability (1 − pi)(1 −
µ), a non-efficient management is observed to be efficient. This induces that, with
probability piµ+ (1− pi)(1− µ), the shareholders would get utility
v(q∗1)− θgq∗1
Then with probability 1− piµ− (1− pi)(1− µ), a non-efficient type is reported.
For other events which happen with probability 1− piµ. But after the null signal,
the shareholders would update the prior to posterior described before. That is, the
shareholders face a management in efficient type, θg, with probability pˆi(sˆ) < pi. Since
in this event, the board also observes nothing, there is no way to get the real type of
management reported. Thus the shareholders has to pay information rent θg qˆ1 +∆θqˆ2
to the θg type management. Here qˆ1 and qˆ2 are the outcomes of production from θg
and θb management respectively, given that no information is revealed to the board
and the shareholders. Therefore, with probability pˆi(1− piµ), the shareholders would
get utility
v(qˆ1)− θg qˆ1 −∆θqˆ2
On the other hand, given no information is reported, with probability 1 − pˆi the
shareholders would face a non-efficient type management, and the shareholders would
give θbqˆ2. Therefore, with probability (1 − pˆi)(1 − piµ), the shareholders would get
utility
v(qˆ2)− θbqˆ2

















The shareholders optimize above problem with respect to qˆ1(sˆ) and qˆ2(sˆ). Then we
get
v′(qˆ∗1) = θg (3.8)
v′(qˆ∗2) = θb + ∆θ
pi
1− pi [1− µ(1− α)] (3.9)
From above expressions, it is easy to check that the compensation to the θg manage-
ment would be the first best which is the same as the case of complete information
and the case of no communication between board and management. However, for the
θb management, the board may not improve the welfare of the shareholders if α→ 1.
It is easy to check that, as α→ 1, the optimal compensation to θb management would
be the same as the case of asymmetric information without board. This implies that,
if there is communication between the board and the management, then the board
might be less useful then the case of no communication between the management and
the board. However, when α→ 0, the optimal compensation to θb management would
be converging to the case of no communication between the board and management.
This implies that if the rent delivered to the board is small enough, then even if
communication is allowed between the management and the board. Then the board
would be useful in the sense that he would improve the welfare the shareholders.
From the property of the management’s utility function, it is easy to check that
the communication between the board and the management would increase the pro-
duction of θb management. To prove this, we only need to check the optimal condition
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Since α ∈ [0, 1], then it is true that the right hand side of the optimal condition is
larger than the case of no communication which is
v′(qˆ∗2) = θb + ∆θ
pi
1− pi [1− µ(1− α)]
≥ θb + ∆θ pi
1− pi [1− µ]
= v′(qˆ0∗2 )
Recall that v′′(y) < 0, then it induces qˆ∗2 ≤ qˆ0∗2 . Therefore the expected rent kept by
the management is also decreased, which would be
pi(1− µ)(θb − θg)qˆ∗2 ≤ pi(1− µ)(θb − θg)qˆ0∗2
The left hand side expression reads as follows. With probability pi, the management
would be an efficient type θg, and with probability 1− µ no signal would be revealed
to the board, so no reports to the shareholders, then the management could keep all
the rent.
The intuition is that: To prevent the potential collusion between the board and
the management, the shareholders needs to pay a rent to the board. This is costly
to the shareholders, then the production level will be decreased. Meanwhile, the
potential collusion benefit to the management also decreases. Now we have proved
Proposition 18.
We want to emphasize one point of Proposition 18. In the Proposition, we only
focus on the reward from the shareholders. But in reality, there are many other
possible channels of rewards. One possible channel is the reward from the market of
directorships which is already described in the model section. Intuitively, the reward
from the market of directorships should affect the communication between the board
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and management, so as the optimal decisions of the shareholders. In next section, we
are going to show that the value from the market of directorships might largely affect
the shareholders’ decision and the collusion between the board and the management.
One immediate implication of above Proposition is that:
Proposition 19. When the share of rent divided to the board is increased,
1. The expected payoff to the shareholders would be decreased;
2. The production level of non-efficient management would be distorted downward;
3. The expected rent to the management would be decreased also.
Proof. To prove these properties, we only need to check the shareholders’s optimiza-
tion problem. It is obvious that the expected payoff of the shareholders is decreasing
as α→ 1. The last two points have been shown in Proposition 18.
From above analysis, we know that, except for the board, all the player’s expected
payoff are affected (downward) from the possible collusion between the board and the
management. In particular, the management’s benefit would also be affected. Recall
that, the production level of the non-efficient type management would decrease. This
may further imply that: The management might have incentive to make his informa-
tion revealed in exchange for reasonable transfer from the shareholders and hope the
shareholders not to hire a board to monitor him. This is because, with the presence of
the board, the management might get less than the reasonable compensation from the
shareholders. Meanwhile, for the shareholders, he might get a lower production level
then the case of no supervision. Thus both the shareholders and the management
would have incentives to make the exchange.
To make the transaction happen, the shareholders only needs to set the reasonable
payment between the amount of expected rent given to the corrupted board and the
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amount of expected information rent given to the management in the case of no board.
3.5 Analysis of the Bargaining
In the set up of the bargaining, the proposal power is not specified to any players.
But we are going to analyze two cases later. In the first one, the board has the
proposal power. This means that the board would first give the offer. The motivation
is as follows. When the board notices that the management is efficient and could get
an information rent, then both know that this rent is completely controlled by the
board. Since the board’s reports would determine the management’s rent. Given this
situation, it is reasonable to assume that the board has the proposal.
In the second case, we would assume that the management has the proposal power.
The motivation is as follows. Think about the case in which the information rent is
large, and both the board and management value the rent. Then it is reasonable to
assume that the management might use the rent as a bait to capture the board and
make him conceal the information.
However, there do exist cases in which the bargaining, so as the potential collusion,
between the board and the management would not happen. This would depend on
the benefit from the market of reputation. Next proposition formally describe this
argument.
Proposition 20. For the board, if the expected difference between telling the truth
and lying is larger than the information rent payed to the management, then the
board would always truthfully report the signals to the shareholders. There would be
no collusion between the board and the management.
Proof. If the board meets a efficient management, then he has chance to get at most
∆θqˆ2 from the bargaining. However, all of the two’s decisions in the bargaining would
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depend on their outside options. For the board, he would get
wS = ρk(ε = 1, η, y)
from quiting the bargaining. This reads as: The board observes that the management
is efficient. He truthfully reports the type of the management to the shareholder, but
does not engage in the collusion. Then with probability ρ > 0, he gets reward
k(ε = 1, η, y) from the market of directorships. However, with probability 1 − ρ,
he might get nothing from the market of directorships. Thus if the board’s outside
option is larger than the most he could get from collusion, i.e.,
wS = ρk(ε = 1, η, y) ≥ ∆θqˆ2 + ρk(ε = 0, η, y)
the bargaining between the board and the management would not take place. Above
condition is equivalent to
ρ
[
k(ε = 1, η, y)− k(ε = 0, η, y)
]
≥ ∆θqˆ2 (3.10)
Above result also induce that,
Proposition 21. If the total outside options of the board and the management is
larger than the information rent, i.e.,
wA + wS ≥ ∆θqˆ2
there would be no collusion between the board and the management.
One immediate implication of above proposition is that, if the reward from the
market of directorships of telling truth is large enough or the punishment from lying
is series enough too, then the board would have no incentive to bargaining with
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the management to divide the potential information rent. Meanwhile, neither does
the management can pay for the bait to capture the board. Thus the type of the
management would be perfectly reported to the shareholders, then the shareholders
would implement the first best contract to compensate the efficient type management.
This would be the best result to the shareholders.
Now let us go to the more interesting case in which the two have common stake,
i.e.,
wS + wA = ρk(ε = 1, η, y) < ∆θqˆ2 + ρk(ε = 0, η, y)
If this is the case, then both of them would have incentives to engage in the bargaining
process so as to get a share of the rent.
The next result is about the equilibrium proposal in the bargaining between the
board and the management, given the above common stake. And this result would
not depend on the proposal power.
Proposition 22. In the bargaining between the board and the management, there
exists a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium, such that
• board always offers x∗S, always accepts an offer xA if and only if xA ≤ x∗A, and
always chooses to quit after receiving an offer xA > x
∗
A if and only if δSx
∗
S ≤ wS
• management always offers x∗A, always accepts an offer xS if and only if xS ≤ x∗S,











Q[1− δA] + ρδA∆k if ρk(1) > δSQ[1− δA] + ρδAδS∆k
12To save some place for notation but without confusion, we let







Q[1− δS] + ρk(0)
)




Q+ ρ∆k if ρk(1) > δSQ[1− δA] + ρδAδS∆k
where ∆k = k(1)− k(0) and β = 1/(1− δAδS).
Proof. The proof of this equilibrium strategy in the bargaining needs some space.
But the idea is straightforward. In any SPE of the bargaining, the responder i would
be indifferent between accepting and not accepting (quit or give a counter offer) the
proposer j’s (j 6= i) equilibrium offer. That is
Q− x∗S = max{δAx∗A, wA}
Q− x∗A + ρk(ε = 0, η, y) = max{δSx∗S, wS}
Here, Q is the information rent which would be divided by the board and the man-
agement. Since we always have xA ≥ 0 and wA = 0, then above conditions coud be
written as
Q− x∗S = δAx∗A
Q− x∗A + ρk(ε = 0, η, y) = max{δSx∗S, wS}
It is easy to check there is only one solution to above equations which is the one
stated in the proposition. We can further prove that this strategy profile is the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining.
Claim 5. The strategy profile described above is a subgame perfect equilibrium in the
bargaining between the board and the management.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Claim 6. This is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining between
the board and the management.
Proof. See Appendix.
Now, we have characterized the unique SPE of the bargaining between the board
and the management. It is easy to check that agreement would be reached immedi-
ately at t = 0 no matter who gets the proposal power; and the board would not quit
the bargaining process.
3.6 Market of Directorships and Supervision
Thus far we have taken the bargaining process separately to the shareholders’s
decision. In this section, we explore the affection from the market of directorships
to the shareholders in more detail. We discuss how the market of reputation would
affect the equilibrium proposal so as the shareholders’s optimal decisions/contract
and the welfare to shareholders.
3.6.1 Sensitive Market
In the first case, we consider the following market mechanism. The market of
directorships are sensitive to the board’s behavior. In other word, the board cares
very much about the value on the market of directorships. To catch this point, we
study the shareholders’ optimal decisions when η → 1. If the board is observed to
misreporting the true type of the management, then the market would give a serious
punishment, k(0, η → 1), to the management. If the punishment is serious enough,
then the condition
ρk(1, η → 1) > δSQ[1− δA] + ρδAδS∆k
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may not be true anymore. This is because, the more serious the punishment from
lying, the higher value on the right side of the condition. But the left side is only af-
fected by the reward of telling the truth. Serious punishment would induce a violation
of this condition. However, for the similar explanation, the other condition
ρk(1, η → 1) ≤ βδS
(
Q[1− δA]− ρδAk(0, η → 1)
)
would be more easily satisfied.
So if the punishment increase too much then quitting the bargaining process would
not be a credible threat to any of the players.
Then the outcome of bargaining would only depends on the board’s expected
punishment from helping management to conceal the signal of his type, which is
k(0, η → 1) and, of course, also depends on the total information rent Q. This
analysis is true, no matter who has the proposer power. In both case, the share of
rent delivered to the board would be increasing with the punishment from the market.
Thus far, the analysis is only about the equilibrium proposal in the bargaining. Let
us go further to discuss how the equilibrium outcome in the bargaining would affect
the shareholders’s decision. Recall the analysis in the shareholders’s optimization
problem. In that analysis, we use αQ to represent the equilibrium proposal to the
board. If the board has the proposal power, then it is x∗S, otherwise it is 1−x∗A. Since
the share of rent delivered to the board is increasing with the absolute value the
punishment from the market of directorships. Then an increase on the punishment
from lying would increase the share α delivered to the board. This would further
reduce the outcome of the production. To prove it, we only need to check the optimal
condition (3.9). For convenience, we represent it here and rewrite α as a function of
the punishment from lying,
v′(qˆ∗∗2 ) = θb + ∆θ
pi
1− pi [1− µ(1− α(k(ε = 0, η → 1)))]
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When k(0, η → 1) increases, the right hand side of above expression also increases,
since v′′ < 0, then we have qˆ∗∗2 decreased. Now we have
qˆ∗∗2 ≤ qˆ∗2 ≤ qˆ0∗2
This also induce that the expected information rent kept by the management would
be decreased. An immediate implication of above result is as follows. The punishment
of lying from market of directorships may not really encourage the board to report
the truth to the shareholders. However, a higher punishment would make the board
get more share from the information rent to the efficient management. This would
induce a higher cost to the shareholders to block the potential collusion between the
board and the management. Furthermore, as it is more costly for the shareholders to
block the collusion, the level of production would decrease more.
In the previous analysis, we only allow the market to give serious response only if
the board chooses to lie about the efficient management’s type. Now we are going to
fix the punishment from the market, but only allow the market to give serious rewards
to the board, if he chooses to report the true type of the management. Therefore,
the condition
ρk(1, η → 1) ≤ βδS
(
Q[1− δA]− ρδAk(0, η → 1)
)
may not be satisfied easily. This is because, the reward to truth reporting would only
increase the left side of the condition. Then it might be violated easily. However, the
other condition
ρk(1, η → 1) > δSQ[1− δA] + ρδAδS∆k
would be easily satisfied in this case. This is because, the high rewards would increase
on both sides of the condition. This induce that, the high reward from the market of
directorships would make the threat of quiting the barging more credible. Therefore,
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both player would consider the opposite might choose to quit in the bargaining.
Unlike the previous case, the two players need to consider both the punishment and
reward from the market of directorships. What matters here would be the absolute
value of the punishment plus the reward and the output. The intuition is as follows,
since the reward of truth reporting is high, so in order to get the board involved, the
management need to give a share of the rent which would be at least as high as the
compensation from the market. However, this would not be enough to make a deal
with the board. Since after they have an agreement, the board also face the risk of
getting exposed. This would make the board get the punishment from the market
which would be a loss to the board. Thus, in order to get the board make a deal
with the management. The management needs to pay as least the rewards from the
market plus the possible loss to the management, which is ∆k.
Above argument is true, no matter who has the proposer power. If the rational
management has the proposal power, then he would think as above. If the board has
the proposal power, he would know that a rational management would think as above,
and would know that the board also knows this. Then proposal from the board also
related to ∆k, the only difference would be on other parameters.
As described in the equilibrium outcome of the bargaining, no matter who gets
the proposal power, the rent delivered to the board would depend on ∆k, the absolute
value of punishment plus the reward, and the total information rent Q. It is easy to
check that this rent would be increasing with ∆k.
As previous analysis, we can now discuss how the equilibrium outcome of bargain-
ing affect the shareholders’s decision. Follow above analysis, we know that the share
α here would be increasing with the rewards to the board, meanwhile we can write
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the shareholders’s optimal condition as,
v′(qˆ∗∗2 ) = θb + ∆θ
pi
1− pi [1− µ(1− α(∆k))]
Then it is easy to check that: When ∆k increases, the right hand side of above
expression increases, since v′′ < 0, then we also have qˆ∗∗2 ) decreased, and also, as
previous case,
qˆ∗∗2 ≤ qˆ∗2 ≤ qˆ0∗2
The expected information rent kept by the management would also be decreased in
this case. We now have another implication. The rewards from market of directorships
may not really encourage the board to report truth neither. High rewards from the
market of directorships only gives the board more bargain chips to raise his share
of the information rent from the management. Meanwhile this would increase the
shareholders’s cost of blocking the collusion between the board and the management.
Furthermore, as before, this would lower the production level.
Now, let us go to the case in which both the punishment and rewards would in-
crease. This represents a market mechanism in which give large rewards to the honest
behavior by the board and give a heavy punishment to the dishonest behavior. No
matter which condition is satisfied this time. The share of information rent delivered
to the board in the bargaining process would always be increasing with the punish-
ment k(0, η → 1) or the reward k(1, η → 1). So all the previous analysis would be
applied here.
We can thus summarize above analysis as the following result.
Proposition 23. If the market of directorships sensitively responds to board’s mis-
reporting, i.e., η → 1 then, compare to the case of no communication,
• the shareholders would pay more to the board to block the collusion;
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• the level of production would decrease;
• the information rent kept by the management also decreases.
3.6.2 Non-sensitive Market
Thus far we have assume that, the market of directorships are sensitive to the
board’s behavior. The result we get right now is, if the market of directorships are
sensitive to the board’s behaviors. Then the more sensitive of the market, the more
costly for the shareholders to block the collusion and the lower production level would
be achieved. Now we are going to do the opposite analysis. We study the case in which
the market of directorships are not sensitive to the board’s behavior. In other word,
the board does not care too much about the value on the market of directorships.
Above situations comes up very often in the board members. In many cases,
the board members are from some other industries or professions which have no
direct relations to the financial industry. One profession is the professor from college.
Their reputation on the board market has nothing to do with their professions. This
non-sensitive market is similar to the non-financial market introduced in the current
research, such as Knyazeva et al. (2013).
To formalize the analysis, we study the shareholders’s optimal decisions when
η → 0. Follow the previous procedure, we first see what happens if the market does
not response to much when the board truthfully report the management’s type, i.e.,
k(1, η → 0)→ 0. If this is the case, then the condition
ρk(1, η → 0) > δSQ[1− δA] + ρδAδS∆k
may not be true any more. The is because the board would not value the reward
from truthfully reporting too much, then quiting the bargaining to report the man-
agement’s type becomes a incredible threat to both players. Then what matters
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would only be the potential loss from concealing the management’s type. Thus the
equilibrium rent divided to the board would only depend on the possible loss from
the market of directorships, which is k(0, η → 0). This has been described in the
equilibrium strategy profiles of the bargaining.
Next, observe that given the equilibrium proposal in the bargaining process, de-
creasing the punishment of lying, i.e., k(0, η → 0)→ 0, would lower the rent delivered
to the board, i.e., α would decrease. Then the right side of the of condition (3.9)
v′(qˆ∗∗∗2 ) = θb + ∆θ
pi
1− pi [1− µ(1− α(k(ε = 0, η → 0)))]
would decrease. Recall that v′′ < 0, then the production level would increase, such
that
qˆ∗∗∗2 ≥ qˆ∗∗2 and qˆ∗∗∗2 < qˆ0∗2
Meanwhile, the expected information rent kept by the management would increase.
Now let us assume that the market does not response to much to the lying behavior
of the board, then we have k(0, η → 0)→ 0, this induce that the condition
ρk(1, η → 0) ≤ βδS
(
Q[1− δA]− ρδAk(0, η → 0)
)
may not be satisfied easily. This is because if the punishment is not serious, then
the expected cost of colluding with the management would not be high, this means
the board may not get a high share of the information rent from the management.
This would induce the board to truthfully report the type of the management to the
shareholders, and get a higher expected rewards from the market of directorships.
Therefore, quiting the bargaining becomes a credible threat to the management. In
order to make the board conceal the type, the management needs to propose based
on both the reward and the punishment. This is exactly what we described in the
equilibrium strategy profile.
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Next, given the equilibrium bargaining proposal, decreasing the rewards to re-
porting truthfully would also decrease the share of rent delivered to the board, i.e.,
α would decrease. Recall condition (3.9) and v′′ < 0, then we have a similar the
production level increased, i.e.,
qˆ∗∗∗2 ≥ qˆ∗∗2 and qˆ∗∗∗2 < qˆ0∗2
and a decreased level of the management’s expected information rent.
Now, let us go to the case in which both the punishment and rewards would
decrease. This represents a market mechanism in which give no or very small reward
to the honest behavior by the board and give a light or no punishment to the dishonest
behavior. No matter which condition is satisfied this time. The share of information
rent delivered to the board in the bargaining process would always be decreasing
with the punishment k(0, η → 0) or the reward k(1, η → 0). Then we have that the
production level would increase.
Summarize above analysis, we have the following result.
Proposition 24. If the market of directorships does not sensitively respond to board’s
actions , i.e., η → 0, then, compare to the case of sensitive market,
• the shareholders would pay less to the board to block the collusion;
• the level of production would increase;
• the information rent kept by the management also increases.
A strong implication from above analysis is that, in order to make the board truth-
fully report the type of the efficient management and lower the cost of blocking the
collusion between the board and the management, a good choice for the shareholders
is to find a board who has the ability to monitor the type of the management but
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also has no direct relation to the financial market. This implication is consistent with
empirical studies which support the positive relation between board independence
and firm performance (see Weisbach 1988, Borokhovich et.al 1996, just name a few
here).
3.7 Board Size and Supervision
In previous analysis, we trade the board of directors as one player. But in reality,
the board is composed by many directors, outside or inside. Therefore the board
room itself is a complicated organization but one assumption here is that there is a
representative board representing the directors.
Now we relax this assumption simply by assuming that there are N identical
directors in the board. The management could bargain with each directors privately
on the rent. In order to make boards conceal the signal of the type, the management
needs to capture all the N directors. The bargaining process is the same as the one
director one management case. We assume that the management can bargain with
each director only once, i.e., no matter if there is an agreement or not between the
management and director i in the bargaining, they will not bargain again.
The analysis of above game is a N duplication of the one director one management
bargaining. The difference is that each director would get a share from Q/N . Here
Q/N is the highest possible rent delivered to director i.
As the analysis in the one management one director case, it is possible that the
bargain between directors and the management may not happen. The reason is as
follows. Think about the N directors as a board with an outside option wˆS ≡ NwS.




k(ε = 1, η, y)− k(ε = 0, η, y)
]
≥ ∆θqˆ2
It is easy to see that this condition would be more easily to be satisfied when N
increases. This induces that no bargaining would happen among the management
and the directors if the size of the board is large enough. Therefore the chance of of
collusion among them would be decreased.
If the above condition is not satisfied, then the bargaining among management
and all directors would take place. Then in each bargaining between director i and
management, they would reach the unique equilibrium outcome which is similar to the
one described in Proposition 22. The unique equilibrium strategy profile is described
as below,
Proposition 25. In the bargaining between each director i and the management,
there exists a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium, such that
• For any director i, he always offers xˆ∗S, always accepts an offer xˆA if and only




• management always offers xˆ∗A, always accepts an offer xˆS if and only if xˆS ≤ xˆ∗S,
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+ ρ∆k if ρk(1) > δS
Q
N
[1− δA] + ρδAδS∆k
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where ∆k = k(1)− k(0) and β = 1/(1− δAδS).
The proof of this proposition is the same as Proposition 22. Follow the analysis
of one management one director case, we discuss how the size of board would affect
the performanc of the firm. In the first case, we consider η → 0 which corresponds to
outside directors or non-sensitive market. No matter who gets the proposal power,
the share delivered to director i, α, is not only a function of k(0), but also a function
of 1/N . Recall the optimization problem of the shareholders, then we have













It is easy to check that: When N increases, the right hand side of above expression
increases, since v′′ < 0, then we have ˆˆq∗2 decreased.
Now, let us go to the case of η → 1, which corresponds to the inside directors
or sensitive market. No matter who gets the proposal power, the share delivered to
director i, α would be a function of ∆k and 1/N . Recall the optimization problme of
the shareholders, then we have













For the same reason as the previous case, we get: When N increases, the right hand
side of above expression increases, since v′′ < 0, then we also have ˆˆq∗∗2 decreased.
Above results tell us that, as long as the bargainings take place, the larger the size
of the board, the higher the cost for the management to capture the directors, and
the lower performance of the firm. The intuition of these results is as follow, to get an
agreement with one director, the management needs to pay a fixed rent to director i,
and this rent will not depend on the size of the board. Therefore, the increas of the
size of the baord, N , would only increase the total cost of of the management.
Summarize above analysis, we have the following implication:
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Proposition 26. The larger the size of the board, the higher the cost for the man-
agement to capture the directors, thus the lower chance for the management and the
directors to collude. However, if the collusion could happen, then the cost for the
shareholder to block the collusion among the management and directors would in-
crease. And the larger the size of the board, the lower the performance of the firm.
Therefore, the lower expected welfare to the shareholder.
Remark Thus far we have assumed that the outside value of each director i.e., the
directors’ value from the market of directorships only depends on the firm’s perfor-
mance which is measured by the outcome of the production. One result from this
assumption is that the bargaining chip of each director will increase with the per-
formance of the firm. Therefore this would induce a high cost for the management
to collude with the directors. Thus, the cost of blocking the collusion would also
increase. This would seriously affect the firm’s performance especially when the size
of board is large. However, if the outside value of each director depends on the av-
erage performance of each director, y/N , then the performance of the firm would be
independent from the size of the board, i.e., the size of the board would not affect the
performance of the firm. Let us see why. If directors’ outside options depend on the















Recall the equilibrium strategy specified in Proposition 25, it is easy to check that
these share would not depend on the size of the board.
Above argument is summarized as follows,
Proposition 27. If each directors’ compensation (penalty) from the market of direc-
torships is related to the size of the board, such as the one defined above, then the rent
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to block the collusion would be independent to the size of the board.
We have not found any results in the existing research which share the same
feature as this proposition. All the exiting research try to find the optimal size of the
board, theoretical and empirical, see Raheja (2005), Coles et al. (2008), and Adams
et al. (2008). However, our result induces that, from the view of anti-collusion, the
board size could be independent to the cost of blocking the collusion, if we choose a
proper market mechanism, i.e., correspond the directors’ per capita contribution to
the firm’s performance. One advantage of doing this is that, this can at least isolate
the influence from collusion between the directors and the management when we try
to find the optimal size of board. But this result still needs more discussion, such as
the case with heterogeneous directors.
3.8 Implications and Policy Suggestion
Our analysis has numerous implications on the board structure and policy sug-
gestion of board regulations. First, in a very general way, if we focus on the function
of monitoring, the board could either improve or worsen the performance of the firm.
The final effects would depend on the accuracy of signal the board gets. In reality the
accuracy of the signal could be related to the efforts of the board directors putting
in the monitoring. Or we can relate it to the transaction cost of board decisions.
Therefore, one policy suggestion is that: If the shareholders want to improve the effi-
ciency, e.g., high output, they could encourage the board to monitor the management
in a more frequent way. This has been confirmed by some empirical research. And
our results give a rational explanation to these empirical predictions. Meanwhile, to
improve the accuracy of the signal, the board could hire specialized account to get
more accurate information on the type of the management.
Second, given that the board could obtain a accurate signal on the type of the
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management, the collusion between the board and the management could also worsen
the performance of the firm, so as the welfare of the shareholders. The magnitudes
of this negative affections would depend on the structure of the board. The more
independent directors in the board, the better the performance of the firm. Mean-
while, the more dependent directors in the board, the worse the performance of the
firm. Therefore, from the view of shareholders or the regulators, fix the position of
the board, then increase the proportion of independent directors could improve the
firm’s performance, e.g., the production level of the firm.
Third, from our last result, we know that, the size of the board could also increase
the shareholders’ cost of anti-collusion, in the sense that, the larger the size of the
board, the higher the cost of blocking the collusion between the board and manage-
ment. However, through a proper designed compensation rules, the cost of blocking
collusion would be independent from the size of the board. This has very important
policy implications. Empirically, people find evidences that both the small size and
large size of board could improve the firm’s performance. The final affection from
the size of board might depend on the features of firms, see Coles et al. (2008). So it
may not be proper to suggest the optimal size of board in general. However, based
on our result, if we link the directors’ market evaluations to the size of the board,
then it is possible that the cost of blocking collusion would be independent from the
size of the board. Therefore, we can focus on other aspects of the board other than
the anti-collusion.
Forth, if we isolate the shareholders from the model, and only focus on the inter-
action between the board and the management, i.e., the bargaining process between
the board and the management, we know that, to get a deal with the board, the man-
agement would pay less rent to the board, if the directors are independent. However,
more rent would be payed if the directors are dependent. These results explain why
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the management might prefer a more independent board other than a more depen-
dent board. And our explanation is that the formal one might help the management
get a deal with the board with a relative low cost. But the later one would induce a
high cost to the management.
3.9 Conclusion
The model in this paper tries to help us understand how the board’s supervision
would affect the performance of the firm and how the collusion between the board
and the management would downward the firm’s performance.
The first message delivered in this paper is that: In general, the board can have
a positive or negative influence on the firm’s performance. Whether the influence is
positive or negative depends on the accuracy of the signal and whether the signal infers
the management is efficient. Under some conditions, if there is no communication
between the board and the management, the shareholder’s welfare would be largely
improved.
However, if the board and the management could communicate to collude, which
is implicitly modeled as a bargaining process, then the shareholders need to transform
part of the information rent, which was supposed to be payed to the efficient man-
agement, to the board. More importantly, this model tells us that board members
who are independent to the financial market, would lower the shareholder’s cost of
blocking collusion. Meanwhile, this also would better the firm’s performance than
the case of board members who are not independent to the financial market. The
last result has been already confirmed by some empirical research. And this models
gives an explanation of the underground mechanism to the empirical research.
If we isolate the affections from the shareholders, then the bargaining outcomes
from the collusion tell us that: The management may prefer a less dependent board to
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a more dependent one. This is because the management could keep more information
rent from the former one than the later.
A simple extension of the model also indicate that larger the size of the board the
higher cost to block the collusion. However, a proper designed market mechanism,
e.g., link the directors’ market evaluation to the size of the board, could potential
induce an independent result between the board size and the cost of anti-collusion.
One critical restriction of this paper is that, the board is composed of homoge-
neous directors, and we can alway find a representative to do decisions for the board.
However, if the directors represents shareholders in different interest, such as the one
discussed in Li and Zhenhua (2013), then directors representing different sharehold-
ers might have conflict in colluding with the management. Then one possible result
is that the check balance among the directors might block the collusion between the
board and the management. This might be a Pareto improvement to the shareholders.
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